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A i m m a r
This thesis endeavour to establish for social-seience a 
theoretical, technological model based on a methodology which 
may prove not to be different from, or which may participate in, 
similar methodologies and models to be adopted by the so-called 
natural sciences and which may also partner and even possibly 
participate in other similar methodologies and models considered 
acceptable to philosophy*
This thesis emphasises those theories and positions ’which 
give important place to the individual in his "private1* aspect 
(formalised herein as 1-p), so making, it Is hoped, a 
contribution towards redressing the Imbalance of emphasis which 
seems to have been placed on the "social1* aspects of the 
individual (formalised herein as b-pj in most social sciences, 
some natural sciences and some philosophies and which imbalance 
places a burden on social-science which it has found difficult 
to sustain*
Finding wanting the naturalist and humanist approaches 
to socialiseience, this thesis will try to establish that the
development of a technological methodology and model applied 
to soclal-sciencc may reinforce the capacity of that science 
to deal effectively with the- matters with which it is concerned• 
to present a greater validity of activity end purpose both within 
and beyond its boundaries5 to make possible an approach to 
social-sclcnee based on the wishes and needs and aims of totalities 
of individuals*
To these ends this thesis will explore* 
the need for a new methodology and a new model based 
thereon to compensate for the defeats of previous models 
for social-science,
its particular applicability to social-science with
emphasis on
a; the vocabulary and concepts of social-science
considered as elements, tools or probes inherent in 
the methodological approach and its model, 
b} the inductive processes leading to the collation and 
handling of the data which is the fundamental ingredient 
of the methodology and its model
c) the cybernetic processes and their systematieation and 
application and relevance to social-science together 
with their implications for philosophy and their 
critical involvement in the technological methodology 
and its model.
all this with the possibility arising from consideration 
of the model, of a continuous development and refinement of 
its outcome by in-built self-correcting processes*
These are many and here must be selective. Above all, 
and apart from my debt to those authors referred to in the text 
and in the Bibliography herein, I acknowledge with gratitude the 
help given by various members of Philosophy Faculties of surrey, 
sussex and London in discussions of this “marginal" theme. 
Particular thanks must go to Dr*Brownhill of surrey, such face 
to face discussion is probably more important than the printed 
word. Professor Bayek has given me brief words of encouragement 
by private letter. Professor tlichie has given me words of cuation 
In similar manner, systems analysts at Brunei, The City University 
and suesex, have given me some insight, by personal discussion, 
into the technical complexities of cybernetics* &r*Vladimir Brix 
former civil servant and adviser to Bolls Hoyce and an engineer 
sociol-scientiet, has given me generously of his technical end 
mathematical skills to illuminate our admittedly dissimilar 
approaches. I am indebted to my early Professors at Log 
including. Bobbins, Hayek and baski for my social-science origins 
and the political philosphy which laid the foundations of my 
later phiiosajjhica 1 orientation* I am also indebted to 
Professor Grubbstr&n formerly of Binkdping University and now of 
the baval Postgraduate school UoA for material and encouragement, 
to Dr.Johan Galtung of the United nations University of Tokyo 
and Geneva for material and advice, to Professor Beishon of the
Open University for material and discussion, to Llbrioge Sibley 
of the USA Social science Research Council for advice.
I am grateful to the “new Yorker" for its generous gift 
of a reproduction of a cartoon here included.
John Lord, philosophy specialist librarian of the 
University of ourrey, has given me immeasurable help in the 
postal supply of volumes to my Scottish home and also in 
discussion of the librarian classification problem in social-science
Above all 1 am indebted to professor Thakur for accepting 
a very mature student on trust of the sincerity which I hope to 
have contributed in small measure to his department.
I attribute none of my errors or confusions to these 
helpers named but gratefully acknowledge my thanks to them.
1* AW&liWU A, concerning the Joint secretariat of the
social science end science Kesearch Councils 
in Britain
2* ABhKhJDUM B* concerning the library and publishing
classifications of the social sciences and 
the possibility of their improvement through 
technological aids and s technological perspective
3. ABAHbDUM C* notes concerning the contributors quoted in
the Quantity/Quality discussion
k* ABBKbBUM Df appending economicsf concepts additional to
those dealt with fully in the ilieais
5* ADDAAAUA concerning reasons for the non-inclusion of
History as soeial-science#
oXioQXGhIj fcidCH JBUBudi 
(with its hoctel}
as an alternative approach to oocial-ocience
ibis thesis Is intended m  a contribution towards 
an amelioration of soeial-science purpose, activity and status 
through the development of a theoretical approach to a 
Technological Methodology with its concomitant model* such 
an approach may prove similar to t cadencies within the so-called 
natural sciences and be seen as parallel to an increasing 
emphasis on the methodology of technology shown by such 
philosophers as Brownhill (1) and bloican (2) for example*
we pose this Technological Methodological approach to
socialiseience as alternative to the naturalistic approach
(35*
debated in the 30s by winch and recently revived by Bhaslcer (h)* 
It is alternative also to the humanist approach which attempts 
to show the fallings of a naturalistic methodology* It Mae some 
affinities with Benton1 a wthird11 alternative (3) to such
methodologies although it parts company with M s  conclusions and
aims*
Brownhi11 lends support to the thesis of a a trong 
movement towards the philosophical technological in his 
article ?lTovmrda a philosophy of Technology” (op*cit) to which
the following is introductory -
"Modern technology can be included in the Kantian
definition of science* The distinction Karl Popper 
makes between science and metaphysics is considered 
arbitrary and his definition of science far too wide*
Yet popper1s belief that scientific knowledge has to 
consist of possibilia is accepted* It appears that 
there is a continuous flow from metaphysical 
speculation to practical test. As metaphysics no longer 
lays the ground for science, the scientist himself 
becomes a specialised metaphysician, and because science 
has not effectively laid the ground fox'* technology, the 
technologist has had to become scientist* Two forces 
appear to be at work: a drive for instability and an urg 
for stability* The intuitive speculations of the 
metaphysician/scientist have to be stabilised by 
critical reason, so the intuitive approach of jolanyi 
has had to go hand in hand with the critical approach of 
Popper* Yet because scientific knowledge remains only 
possible, the final step in creating stability baa to be 
an attempt to convert the knowledge to practical use. 
Metaphysics, science ana technology can be considered 
as a unity made up of different levels in an attempt to 
apprehend and finally master nature*H
while we have caveats on this instability/stability 
syndrome with its final aim of the creation of stability; on the 
possible assumption that technological methodology is mainly or 
completely concerned with practical application* and on the final 
"mastering of nature”j yet we claim that exposes such as 
Brownhill* © give strong suppoi't to our thesis of the possible 
philosophical acceptability of a Technological Methodological 
approach to soeial-science*
It is further necessary to note that in using the term 
"science” we do not exclude ajeial~science,as refreshed by our 
technological methodological approach, from that embracing term. 
This will need Justification since such inclusion or embracement 
is contested on many scores. I,, is claimed, that the social science 
cannot be termed scientific since they d.o not use the methods of 
"science”. It le claimed that the social sciences are descriptive 
only and not capable of generating predictive laws. It is argued 
that the social scientist, participant in his scene, is incapable 
of forming objective Judgments and that therefore his conclusions, 
labelled subjective in a pejorative sense, are limited or of. even
suspect validity.
We may inquire what is meant by the "methods" of "science”: 
vvhat are the "methods” of soclal-science • why there should be 
considered to be such incompatibilities as to sunder the two 
entirely? Assuming that we are not involved in such elementary 
errors as holding up test tubes, white coated laboratory workers 
and inflexible laws as the criteria from which to diminish the
eocial-sclentist: assuming also that we are not involved in such
elementary errors as holding up sample questionnaires, limited 
surveys and ideal societies as the criteria from which to Judge the 
soelal-scientiet: then we may be able to find a closer approach
to a possible unity of methodology between the "scientist1* and 
the "scciel-scientlst” as to make their sundering unnecessary, 
even if their identities are sustained*
We draw attention to the great changes that have overtaken
the "natural” sciences during the past decades and which may have 
removed them from their assumed isolated position vis-a-vis 
socialiseience.
uC note -
a) the demotion of physics from its magistral position 
among, the "natural" sciences *
b) the irresolutions caused by the impact of quantum mechanics,
c) the dilution o.f the concepts of law and the causal nexus 
by tendency statements and attention to multiple causes,
b) the general acceptance of the inevitable 'intrusion of 
the participant observer in investigations of all kinds*
Much developments have resolved many of the arguments which 
supported a dichotomy between the possible methodologies of the 
"natural" as opposed to the "social” sciences* btrong partnerships 
can be observed for example between departments of physics, 
medicine and biology which soften the boundaries erstwhile assumed, 
bringing back the Individual subject as an important basis of 
natural science developments* The parallel and alternative 
answers to investigations made apparent by quantum mechanics lead 
inevitably, it seems, to reappraisal of the concepts of law and 
cause* hocial-science makes small claim beyond tendency statements 
and thus finds its stance in this matter is closer to the revised 
attitudes of the natural scientist to- laws and causation.
It may therefore be not a question of antithesis or not 
between the so-called social and natural sciences but a common need 
to find refined methods, refined models, refined techniques which 
may well prove to be similar or even identical in both fields* 
hone of the a rguments says Bagel (6) against the employment of 
such freshly considered "scientific" methods in the social science 
is considered as insuperable.
Graph ana map analyses and carbon dating are minor 
methods which have proved themselves, for example, to be indeed
scientific and of use not only to the natural scientist but•also
to the socialisexenliet and to the humanist alike* These and 
such like them may be only heralds of still newer methodological 
approaches appropriate to and beneficial across the board* buch 
may prove to be the technological methodology we advocate with 
the models which w e present*
Logical positivists have been in the past the main exponents 
of arguments for the unity of the sciences, both natural and 
social, the master conception of the development of the empiricist 
argument being that of quantification and' measurement# The 
sciences on which the logical positivists based their arguments 
have however moved on considerably since the Vienna days as we 
have discussed above and, moreover, quantification and
measurement now face the challenges of greater attention to 
diversity which requires the exploration of quality inherent in 
quantity and the acceptance of tentative or alternative answers*
Humanists powerfully object to such positivist approaches 
arguing that because events are unique and because scientific
methods are incapable of understanding the true nature of human 
behaviour, the application of positivist approaches to social 
phenomena, which rest on human behaviour, is invalid*
but we wish to stress in our alternative strategy that
whe recent developments in technological methodologies have made
it possible to gather, store, translate and utilise information
of totalities of unique data and thereon develop dynamic models
which go far beyond conceptions concerned solely or mainly with 
quantification.
ueber and other such investigators used methodological 
approaches which saw social science methodologies as being 
essentially involved in selections and abstractions from 
individual actions: they had not yet available to them such
techniques inherent in current technological methodologies 
which seek to approach totalities of individual data, that data 
being qualitative rather than merely quantitative in content 
because of its very totality and diversity*
such totalities of data in their qualitative aspect may 
not only circumvent the* humanist thesis but also reduce the 
danger of crude subjective interpretation, admittedly within 
its culture bonded constraints, which has for so long been held 
as one of the main criticisms levelled against social-science 
by naturalist and humanist critics-alike*
If such totalities of qualitative data developed from 
individual expressions of need and choice form the basis of our 
technological social-science approach, we might see these as 
close to the "informed Judgment” stressed by holanyi* Although
such noted commentators as I upper (?}, Lakatos (8) and Muegrave (9 
dismiss the folanyian approach as subjective and pseudo mystical,
I would ally myself with such as Brownkill (10) who present 
hie arguments with sympathy*
ne admit that acceptance of the technological methodology 
may be said to be based on a tentative and original act of faith 
which, following Tolanyi’s reasoning, must be indwelt to be known 
bo Brownhill extracts in his paper* Brownhill attempts to 
balance the arguments which criticise folenyifs approach as an 
advocacy of subjectivism with later work which sees its respect 
for objectivity.
Brownhill refers to Popper’s castigation of the approach 
as a symptom of a "deadly disease - the.dissolution of the 
most objective of all sciences - physics” (11)* Brovmhill 
also quotes Lakatos (12) as referring to "i/olanyi* o pseudo- 
mystical post critical message”* Musgrave (13) is among other 
philosophers who, Brownhil! observes» have developed and continued 
such criticism. However to balance such argument Brownhill 
refers to such recent works as that of Brennan (14) which 
submit that „olanyifG arguments transcend the distinction.between 
the subjectivist and objectivist positions. Brownhill finally 
comes to the conclusion that the original and tentative act of 
faith stressed by Tolanyi, suitably reasoned and underwritten 
by associates in whom the"ncw apprentice” has respect for their 
experience and who vouch for the usefulness of the act of faith,
cv
make itss rational acceptance until one is in a position to 
check or challenge its validity*
Clearly the acceptance of the veridical qualities of 
alternative frameworks depend on a consensus of interpretation 
by colleagues, quite apart from such criteria such as beauty, 
simplicity, economy and coherence which may be proposed. The 
"indwelling”, the "assimilation of particulars"9 the digestion 
of abstract concepts, the- acceptance of "tqcit knowledge", 
the extension of our edacities by probes or tools, are Initial 
ingredients of a frame»,wrn which can then be tested, accepted or 
rejected.
bo we may look for the tentative acceptance of our 
alternative .technological methodological approach* Indeed 
evidence pointing to such possible acceptance is indicated by 
bchutz (15) "The particular methodological devices developed
by the social sciences in order to grasp social 
reality are better suited than those of the natural
sciences to lead to the discovery of the general principles 
which govern human knowledge.19
Such methodological devices as those conceived by hatanson {16* 
derive from aa"underlying conceptual framework in terms of which 
concrete studies in history , sociology and economies and the like
are carried cut and in terms of which they receive its general 
rationale, methodology in the terms in which 1 am using it implies 
a certain order of philosophical commitment. n philosophical 
commitment ia probably very close to the underlying cct of faith 
expressed by Poisryi and elucidated by Brownhill in his paper*
do we suggest that our development of a technological 
methodology and model and Its application to social'-science 
is no arbitrary device but has an explicable rationale behind it 
which will be explored in consensus.
According to hissing (17) methodologies can lay claim to 
being scientific and valid, if they are used regularly by 
members of a scientific airmunity with the criterion of membership 
being the empirical one of regular, effective and collaborative 
association with other members. This fits with Brownhlllfs 
discussion of Tol&ayian ltconseasustr which is his criterion for the 
acceptability of a theory, in which he says "truth for a member of 
the scientific community would consist of a correct interpretation 
of phenomena in accordance with hie own interpretative framework. 
This is the personal knowledge of the scientist or rather his claim 
to personal knowledge. If this claim is to be accepted aa knowledge
1 given the status of Knowledge? it will have to fit in with the 
knowledge already possessed toy the calamity i.e. their 
interpersonal knowledge* It is then given the status of’1 truth” 
as far as the community ie concerned* A crisis arises when a 
scientist’s theory or package of theories is unacceptable* It 
does not fit into the framework *♦,« If it changed the framework
not be science any more**.** The real attempted 
revolution for rolaayi came from the attempt to plan science 
and divert it from its search for knowledge to one of utility*
In that case science would not toe science any more tout technology* 
we ourselves are not convinced that knowledge need necessarily 
toe sundered from utility any more than science need toe sundered 
from technology. The valid framework for folanyi lies in the 
recognition of Its dynamic potential which may Indeed lead to the 
identification and solution of problems but which possesses its 
own momentum ox* power' developed in advance of the emergences 
identification and solution of the problems.
There is one critical difficulty in the establishment 
of a consensual judgment as to validity among scientists* here 
considered to include aocial«-scientists9 which is not peculiar
to those avenues* This Is the need for all specialists to 
engage in remoter and newer disciplines even when they do not 
completely understand and must take on additional trust* for 
lack of human a bility and time* only a vague outline of other 
territories (16). Here It is perhaps the philosopher who in 
pointing out inconsistencies car* clarify and validate the 
consensual framework*
Factually it is obvious that there exists & community 
national and international of social~seientists, supported toy
academic institutions and research institutes: that there exists 
the need for a body of aocial-*scieotists who have sought 
some sort of protection- from the umbrella term "science*** that 
the nmorella tern "science** has mistakenly 'been supposed by some 
philosophers e.g* Winch, to be exclusively the perquisite, of 
the older style "natural" sciences*.that there is regular
and collaborative association among social*-sclenti©ts 
particularly aimed at the development of a framework, a
methodology, a theory and models that will refine and demonstrate 
their discipline*
In support of our claim to the inclusion of social^science 
within the body of scientific methodologies we might try to 
expose the frequent misleading tendency to dichotomise. In 
particular we would single out here the commonly asserted 
division of kno„ledge into that concerning phenomena which are 
"natural" and those which a re “artificial1* or into two cultures ** 
the one scientific and the other non-scicntific or the one 
rational and the other irrational (19)* We would not wish 
to go so far ao to blanket out entirely semantic distinctions 
which may prove helpful in divisions of labour but wo would 
wish to override unrealistic and unhelpful divides of matters 
which merely sunder the spirit of enquiry which animates both' 
sides (20)* It is not only linguistic confusions that lead to 
philosiophical misconstructions and absurdities, investigated
in such detail by Kyle and lust in in Wittgenstein’s wake*
Possibly as great a culprit is dichotomous and even trichotomous • 
classification which creates spurious problems, as some might see 
in the -mind/body debate* 'We would wish that workers in the fields 
of "science" , Maocial~science1 and 1? technology" might see their
method©logical boundaries as coterminous and even overlapping* 
that benefits in one field might be used to spill over into others* 
that titular nomenclatures be considered as flexible# Xhis is 
much leas than the generalisation of disciplines and a little 
more than Thafcur's recommended "bridge-building"(21) •
touch an attitude can take into account folanyi*© 
emphasis on utility; yet it need not transform science into 
technology* both science and technology can have their critical 
theories and their own methodologies: both science and technology 
can discern overlaps and even identities* While it may be useful 
to sustain the distinction it may be harmful to reinforce tensions 
and oppositions based merely on verbalised dichotomies of 
classification#
If then it be accepted s albeit tentatively and with an 
"act of faith*** that social-science is indeed scientific in its 
renewed sense9 that the technological methodological may be 
&pproprlate to ; » lUk l» X *-<■' X SlSilM&Ss and that increasingly 
philosophers of science and scientists are turning their 
attention to the philosophy of technology (22), then we feel 
considerable confidence in advancing our thesis. This we may do 
in spite of the possibility admitted toy Cohen (op.eit.at 22)
that "inherited par ocbialisms and prejudices deriving from the 
dominant tradition in philosophy of science will continue to 
shape contemporary work.”
We could turn for additional support for our thesis to such studies 
that remind us of the
"provocative thesis of tornst Kach* the rooL experience of
"technology as the source of our concept formations
themselves" and "if there is a paradigm, within the 
dominant tradition regarding a Science/Technology relation 
it is one which simply takes for granted the primacy
of science." Ihde {23) challenges this tradition end 
thinks it even possible to invert the relationship of science and 
technology to "feehnoXogy/tocience and see Technology as the cause 
or origin of science*" IMe admits that.if a theory of action * 
is the foundation of a theory of knowledge, if technology is the 
ontological source of science, if praxis is- prior to concept, 
then no easy reconciliation between praxis philosophy and its 
idealistic counterpart can be found* However, we do not wish 
to accompany Ihde into this primacy debate
Technology/science
seience/fechnology 
as# quoting Heidlgger (op*cit#p*108) he seems intent on extending* 
We wish merely to use lhdefs emphases to advance our hypothesis 
that it is contemporaneously consensual to stress the technological 
side of the argument to redress any Imbalance brought about by 
"inherited parochialism and prejudices*"
Technology is as theory laden as pure science pace Bunge{2k) 
an approach which is overlooked or explicitly denied, by many 
scientists and philosophers* we accept that there must be a
division of approach to exploratory knowledge through
a) science (pure;
b) science (applied) 
cj technology
which seems to m  a limited consensual view even if it be 
admitted that the boundaries are blurred or overlapping* So we
view the technological as partner to the scientific, not
f- V-A Cu“ t#  1  ^ vb a i  t l« £ *  ^  C** h i  dw 1» b ii *& C i  Ji C* £ ** «£* 1  Jtv i ^  i^ 3 J. ,i. wji. *£• stress
with its partner parallel claim to theories as well as and before 
their possible specific applications# liie theories of the
technological methodological approach will stress the 
inventive 
innovatory
diffueionlst
characteristics, all in attempts to reveal ultimate reality ~ 
(polsnyi1 s claim for pure science in hie Personal nnowXedge1* Ch* 6#) 
fhere are those who would claim that the technological theoretician 
will not advance fax* along the road towards ultimate reality
irvx£u b-e
but that his sights on it in company with the scientist, 
pure or applied, as well as the philosopher cannot be denied#
It is not essential, as many critics suggest, that 
invention, innovation and diffusion in their technological 
methodological origins are spurred by materialistic ends, although 
much research is thus fostered# fhie need be no more the spur 
for the technological methobologiciao than for the -scientist#
His aims stand before the application of his tools or probes 
which he sees as extensions of his abilities and his purposes 
and those aims may even make their own metaphysical stand if, as
Brovnhili suggests, technological methodology 11 is no longer 
parasitic on science but has necessarily become part of science
as science has become cart of metaphysics1' (scientia article pp
610/1)
iluch discussion of technological methodology seems to 
proceed from the applications envisaged and not from his 
methodological viewpoint or framework* However Brownhill for 
example, argues that in fact technology has developed systematic
ideas of. its own and that therefore it would be possible to expand 
them without reference to practicality^ that in fact the 
teclinologist methodologician would be acting “as if” he were pure
scientist end might be classified with the pure scientist as a 
fundamental researcher* Bunge seems to consider the theories so
projected could be regarded as scientific theories of action, 
although he stresses that they must be grounded in scientific laws*
In these as in other discussions, we can see the 
fluctuation between the need to cross boundaries e.g. ,.thc 
technological methodologician seen as scientist, even pure scientist 
sod the need to specialise i*e# the technological methodologician 
seen in his own right as overseeing the possibilities of specific 
application* here we see the fluctuation between the researcher*s 
desire to maintain the “purity” of his ini effectual approaches end 
his awareness of the possibility of the ultimata applications from 
his theories# If the connotations, philosophical and other, 
entailed by uliG use of ”technological” has led to lie subsumption 
through generalisation of all the sciences and emphasis placed on 
the practicalities of its disposition, then we possibly usefully 
here assert its specialism and its theoretical aspect, without 
denying its participations and its applications. ■
If boci&l~se 1enee is rightfully to establish its 
technological methodological approach and, at the seme time, 
look for an association, with imprimatur of approval, with 
philosophy, it must also examine those “complex moral, 
epistemological and aesthetic issues” which Thakur (25) sees as 
the special provinces of philosophy and which, at first approach, 
it might seem that a technological methodology is incapable of
representing# such criteria approach closely to those dolanyi 
postulates standing for those “intellectual harmorues which 
reveal more profoundly and permanently than any sense experience 
the presence of objective truth”, we, resting on the approaches 
of such as Eussell and Ayer, place basic importance on those 
vary experience of the individual senses but we would also 
try to ally our approach to the diverse criteria Tkakur and 
r'olanyi enumerate#
bo far as aesthetic considerations are concerned we shall 
particularly apply our thoughts and arguments towards the 
elements, the tools or the probes of our advocated methodology 
and its model# Ihe model itself, we shall hope to present in 
aesthetically satisfying simplicity* Our approach to 
epistemological rectitude will be elaborated in our arguments 
concerning the tool or probes of word and concept# fhe more 
abstruse matter of moral considerations will be tackled in our 
approaches to the refinement and adjustment of individual choice 
through the levels of development displayed in our model for 
social-science.
In summary ~ the technological hethodologician having 
entered into his tentative eoromitment with his devised method, 
emphasises a system which is dynamic rather than static, short run 
and circumscribed rather than long run and universal, subject to 
to so -o n e y  swa uo-imoxiws re* u n o r  w^iolc* la w s #  l a o  m e th o d  w iL r l
contain within itself inbuilt ingredients for continuous 
reassessment ana redevelopnent based on the existing and foreseeabl 
availability of skills, with tools or probes for the extension of 
his purposes ana the attainment of his ends* He will, 
nevertheless be aware of the laws, the statics, the long runs,
the universale of oo~thinkers. He will represent the summation 
of skills currently available to his society within its resources 
oncl oversee their optimal use and from his observation of the soil 
in which these skills are nourishedf he will direct a feedback - 
which will enhance, neutralise or alter the substance and 
direction of those skills all of which will only be effective 
if the# can be supplied with appropriate instruments or tools or
probes to extend those skills* His own stock of rules grounded 
in i;is scientific and philosophical awareness, will enable him 
in concert with his peers, to ^maintain an overall assessment of tm  
adequacy, rectitude, direction and suitable rate of development
in the technological field and to guide that progression . ^
with constant regulator# feedback which will act as control 
and rectifier* He himself will be something of the nature of 
the cybernetician or helmsman (n.b* origin of cybernetics from 
Or*meaning helmsman)♦ fhese element fet* Cl 11 Cc _lp 1* 0 Co i3lib of the 
technological model illustratin ?w tl »• ■*•' • - i. v- t* i i dology is examined 
in the following sub^section*
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•.odel for the Technological 
Methodology
It the need for clarification and rigourising'of
soc Xal-sc1enee can be seen as possibly advanced by such a
Technological Methodology as we have been suggesting to Improve 
on the muddle and discredit into which social science seems to 
have fallen observed by such philosophers as winch, and later, 
Bhsolcer who a peaks of the “current crisis in the social sciences4* 
(1) as well as by many natural scientists, humanists and the man- 
in-ihe-street alike, then our objective may be further advanced 
by the development and presentation of an explanatory model
which reflects the methodology discussed*
That models are useful instruments of clarification is 
frequently admitted although they are “abstractions from reality 
and not replicas of it“ (2) nous'by establishes criteria of 
simplie i ty, o c c omoosa bility and adaptability for the construction 
of models, while biasing (fj stresses that the processes of 
“improving a model requires more varied bud detailed empirical 
data than are needed for the initial stages of construction.if 
■;*o v.-Xc C'jiji w 4 o she leeoow.cUi*1 vdiiOx.*, s %.a crucial ingredient 
of our model will assure the possibilities of continual 
improvement and adaptation of the model. This may seem close to 
Braithwaite* s position in describing “the modelliet doctrine of 
scientific explanation"8 as a “stage by stage doctrine1'(4)
Liesing sees the model as mauing possible a chance to continue 
the ‘'analytic clarity of mathematical thinking with at least a 
reasonable e&xkee. amount of empirical complexity and realism'1, 
eraitbmxute sounds a note of caution in use of the term “model1 
union he iinas v ery close to the concept of “theory*1 and in fact 
ofrers “tneoruncuia or “affectionately5 a “theorita using a Latin 
wi* ‘-•paiiiSii ariainutivo1* ior it in substitution.
we note that there are such as Kempel and oppenheim (5) who 
discounted with other philosophers of positivist association 
the importance of models.'to themes. However, even contemporaneously 
others e.g. Lenin (6) v.ere equally insistent on the value of the 
model, fills tendency of acceptance seems to have developed 
strongly since that time to such .an extent that hardly any expose 
omits some modelling, whether diograir.matic or pictorial, as 
attempted relfection of conceptual schema* In early manner models- 
were of verbal metaphor and frequently in the manner of a single 
word; when developed two or multi-diiaensioxra 1 models and more 
recently an approach to the dynamic.
be respect Lro&beck* c comments (7) that “diagrams and 
pictorial devices cannot be complete.” no one could assert that 
the model can completely reflect the reality it attempts to 
clarify: but the dynamic, multi-dimensional models in current 
use are very far from ogxBg/pictorial or alugrammatio. Even the 
admittedly metaphoric approach summerieed by Berlin recently - 
indicates the importance of the model to philosophy -
“1 have always thought that the .history of philosophy 
is largely the history of changing models. The examination 
of these models, is, in s may, a very typical philosophical 
task* The only way in 'which you can explain things to
people, usually, is by some kind of analogy from the known 
to the unknown. You are faced with something pussling:
whet is mant what iw/fe'Surei fnb you say *hell human nature 
is rather like ... too logy, botany - we know a good deal .
about that, human nature is not awfully unlike that. There is 
a general science of all creatures in nature - this is what 
the loth century thought - why should ..e suppose that human 
beings are different? Zoologists are able to produce a
“science of bees and beavers and, In time, we shall have a 
science of man on the same sound naturalistic principles, 
ilato thought that the mathematical model was the model, 
that you could someho*. explain the .universe in geometrical 
terms by deducing what there is from xhs some kind of 
indestructible, ultimate truth, to which he tried to shov; 
the path* then you saw the idea of the good, you would 
understand how everything is necessarily what it is* 
Aristotle used biological models* In the 17th century 
for example, people tried to explain what society was like 
in terms of legal models - that is what the social contract 
is all about and -when a new model comes it throws light on 
something. The new model liberates one from the oppression 
of the old one but obscures the truth which the old model 
■ showed. In turn it is re*x>!aeeb by another model and then 
the fourth model comes and the fifth* because there are 
certain problems that oppress us at particular moments 
of history* n
Berlin’s generalising assertions are supported importantly 
and more specifically by Harre (8) who describes what he calls 
a complete revolution in the philosophy of science according to 
which Models are essential to theories* lie sees the model as a 
picture or description, the retionalc88!JlS|tion of which will 
proceed under the canons of a theory of models
a) a description of the phenomena for which the theory is 
devised.
hj a description of the central model and one or more 
descriptions of the central model and one or more 
descriptions of the material on which the central 
model is based
c) a description of the treatment ox" the central model as a 
hypothetical mechanism.
l-ratt insist that th el 1b a commonly used and helpful 
approach to the understanding of an intellectual or practical 
problem as a visualisation of cerebrations and conceptualisations 
proceeding thcrefroxn (9) -
’•Science is simply one very specialised f o m  of model making 
to represent particular limited aspects of reality e.g. Hewton1s 
model based on Keaton’s laws”
“Theories or models ere imaginative constructs and may use 
concepts as a sort of scaffolding”
“Those who conceive of explanation as the assimilation of the 
prims facie unintelligible to.the intelligible are bound today 
to ley great stress on models for their view amounts to an 
assertion that it is in fact a model that any explanatory 
theory must provide: its very point will be the striking of 
an analogy between what is to be understood end what is under­
stood already# *f
The tern “model*1 deriving as it does, in common with so 
much specialised language with all the attendant confusions that 
this involves, from everyday usages, continues to carry with it 
an aura of the pictorial or mathematical. If a model can be 
constructed from a series of conceptual tools which summated 
may be presented as reflective of the reality modelled, then we 
2i4CJ.y Aici v o v*o. v ^no oh. 2- aw4..* 2i..,4W1.o 1 w.hroil io r e verbal and even poetic
metaphor, from a model that was even a two or three dimensional 
reflection of tnut reality, to a dynamic model reflecting or even 
paralleling the motions as well as the components of the reality 
which is the subject to the attempted modelling# This will bring 
the model as ;,e hope to present it close to a more modern concept 
oi the leim i # c • c* -i.ui1 u r , mot iug, ref ioc txon or Li is to tali i*xo s 
with which it is concerned, thus corresponding to barre’s third 
criterion#
It may well be that social-science has never had a model 
of its own and has merely appropriated models not entirely suited 
to its needs; for example, the legalistic model of the social 
contract to which Berlin refers and which constrained socialiseienc 
towards the political seems possibly to lie behind Benton’s 
approach which we reserve for a later discussion. As models are 
in essence removed one step, at least, from reality, such 
secondhand models pose a double remove for social-science.
If we can develop a model for the methodology of technology, we 
may see that it is of particular and even prime relevance for the 
social-scientist. Diagrammatic and dynamic modelling will provide 
a meeting ground between the social-scientist and the systems 
engineer which w e shall see as a necessary part of our exercise.
feigl (10) diagrammatises in the form of a logical model 
his discussion of the^orthodox view of theories’1 in the following 
manner *
Primitive Concepts
-gv. Defined Concept
.^Empirical Concepts
^ Boil of Observation 
(experience)
Feiel’ „ model haa & sense of movement, in logical form, 
from the minutiae of observed expericicef through the levels 
of refinement to concepts to postulates, he shall attempt to 
parallel this by adaptation in our technological model.
Importantly for the purposes of such models lies emphasis on 
the soil of observation on which they reat* This for the
technological model will rest on the individual technological 
methoclologieian1 s shills and the probes 'or tools at his disposal, 
ilia shill will have developed through training, apprenticeship, 
personal ^Judgment and an overriding concern with 11 know how" as 
well as Mknov? that” and will have received its grounding in 
attention to scientific discipline and philosophical guidance* 
ffe must stress that at this stage we are not concerned with 
individual practical problems nor with the specific apparatus 
for their solutions* Vie are seeing the technologist as 
methob&agician. Brownhill argues that “as technology has 
developed systematic ideas of lie own it would be possible to 
expand them without reference to practicality” and "the
theoretical technologist could expand the systematic ideas of 
technology for their own cake*” There are those who would argue 
that the aim of all science let alone technology is of practical 
direction; Brownhill suggests this and £arvie (11) openly 
declares it* U'e do not deny the possible ultimate aim of 
application yust as we would admit no preconceived sterility in 
the e thical arguments of philosophy. But for the moment we are 
concerned with the preconditions foi^/upp2lSations which will he 
specific but develop from within a total methodology*
be shall recognise a congeries or consensus of individual 
technological methodologicians as the base of our model and we
shall see that their attention will be focussed on the field 
through an apparatus of processes, tools or probes which will, 
at this stage, be verbal, conceptual and rule constrained in a 
manner one degree in advance of their apprentice approaches, 
since irmneiSiSii/ulli^fli^e refined their observations.
The Technological he thodologician will be guided by rules 
developed from a manifold of forces. His devotion will be 
oriented towards praxis and homo faber and he will follow 
philosophies which accentuate such attitudes. In this setting 
and in company with consensual methodologicians lie will survey 
the parameters within which he will be constrained* he will be 
aware of the necessities posed by other branches of science in 
terms of their laws, their rules or their tendency statements.
Yet with the instruments, tools or probes of hie particular 
expertise, he should be able to recognise rectitudes or flaws 
in the manner of presentation of such laws, rules or tendency 
statements and follow what he sees as their adjustment In emergent 
light* lie will be alert to the faults or limitations of bis 
instrumental equipment and to the needs to supplement or refine it, 
since he will constantly read the unmistakable signs of a feedback 
which reject© a fault.
His instruments will be importantly linguistic or symbolic. 
His shill will consist to a large degree on his ability to 
translate or on hi© choice of translation from data to such 
language a© may be adapted to the rules of his systems In 
cybernetic process. He will have to exercise flexibility in 
relation to the signal© he receive© of acceptance or rejection of 
inputs but the system with its feedbacks will ensure that there 
will not be deterioration into disintegration*
An important tool In hie armoury will be the cybernetic 
black^boxing of specifics t?hich can remain unezamined or intect 
during the processes of investigation* There are admitted dangers- 
in the overuse of such bracketings which are in the nature of 
resort to ceteris paribus approaches but the oystematiBation 
must be relied on to be sensitive to and throw out inappropriate 
use of the black.boz*
Following FeigX’s logical lead we present our 
di&grammatisation of the Technological model in the following
form ~
Continuous uoassessment- of posaibilia and     j>
■development of new ana refined \r„
controls jo
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The detailed explanation of the diagr amcca t i sa t ion on the 
previous page must be left until our sections on tool end probes 
and on the cybernetic systematization which is the najor element 
in the working of the model, however we should like to stress 
the importance of the groundsoil of the individual technological 
methocHogician with the background that we have already indicated.
we place considerable emphasis on the capacity of the 
model, having reached the final level of refinement, 
continuously to reassess possibilia and to develop new and 
refined controls the need for which will have emerged from 
the continuous feedback which is ingredient to the model*
Constraints to which consensual judgments must submit 
will ber^Je mainly from other sciences and oosBibly from
philosophic indicators, which have not made sufficient Impact 
at groundsel! level or which have emerged to importance 
at e time subsequent to the outset.
The matter of black-boxing, for the time b elng* may be 
0* jL O' O jt* O C* bracketing or using ceteris paribus techniques
until such time as we develop its consideration further in our 
section on cybernetics.
suck a presentation of the model of the technological 
methodology la clearly based on intellectual attitudes and 
expressed through intellectual conceptualisation* it takes into 
account the skills, extended by tools, probes and apparatus 
of technological methodologici&ns yJio see with the eyes of 
homo fader or with what, in santian metaphor, might be termed 
technological spectacles, yet it must not be confused with the 
xii 1x2. v iuvAppM.r«*1iuuGu or c uxlcctxons of &*ocn iivlixoxi f orm tne 
elements instrumental in the practical applications which may 
possibly and subsequently be made in its extension*
'’Technology is no mere means5' says heidigger- (12) 
or ’’Technology is a way of revealing for "’techne” is broader 
than technique end reveals or b rings to presence something which 
may be possible* u fore recently in 1977 Kurup, mitcham ana fackay 
and hay ton lend support to the argument that increasingly 
historians of technology are going beyond the artefacts to treat 
technology as a social phenomenon with intellectual and 
c n ix o £ juL,iixcu x  ns2.0iic<* f l u )
bo v.e taue pains to re-emphaeise that our choice of a 
technological methodological approach reflected in the model, 
is not to bo conceived as an ad hoc methodology for solving 
par o ic u iu r  pi*oclems, a i thougii t its re  xs no unlxm co say th a t  1 1 may 
not so do* It is rather a rationale of approach which parallels
and probably replaces earlier methodologies. rolanyi indeed 
argues that a good theory or methodology or model will lead to 
the potential solution of problems. The emphasis we would place 
would oe ’’lead toH and "potential**. ue would go .even father and se 
the technological methodology with its model? as capable of 
exploring approaches to matters not yet formulated or crystallised 
and in this \,ill lie much of its justification. The model we have : 
demonstrated carries 'within itself thecspecify for self 
adjustment and extension*
The most cosison reasoning about the inadequacies of 
social-ecience seems to stem from their inability to cure 
all specifled problems or even some of them effectively, be 
suggest that in concentrating on a technological model xio can 
create a net methodological rationale which mill be more 
appropriate to the cleansing of social-science than attempts 
to tackle the totality of problems piecemeal and without an 
overall methodological vie*?.
For do we wish our approach to the technological 
methodology to be tainted with the fears arising from surveys of 
so-called Technocracy with its political overtones, hesitations 
arising from the questloaning of appropriateness or safety or 
probity of an individual process, tool or probe in approach to 
a specific problem, in no way justifies a turning away from the
technological methodology are advocating* which smy prove 
to be tutor to as cell as steersman of specific techniques in 
their- approach to specific problems.
There iioe frequently been in ell lie ids of philosophical 
thinking, the rejection of developments which in the' historical 
pa&t have oeen labelled ^heretical”,. ^ deviant15 or "dangerous%
There wee an element of fear behind such rejection. ~ueh fear 
hue toon apparent i n  recent years in 4 rejection which could he 
nnxT'rl&QCi by a consideration of the concept of ’’Technocracy* 
with its pejorative connotations of ill-placed power, we would 
hope to be able to divest our TechnologiesX Methodology from such 
fears, k<.£egel«fc&£&£ (lb) refer to the ^specter of technocracy 
where power is seen to inhere in the inventive processes of the 
faceless technocrats in long white cents who ere making decision t 
today which rightfully end by law ahaaid be mode op Congress.w 
but uhstoor politicians should be at the helm or the itclaphysician, 
social-solontist, solestist or technologicsi methoaologician, 
ixom {13) feels that society "gets the science it neither 
demands nor deserves, nor needs but some uneasy compromise 
between all three*u If the question;- he rents answered are 
"ttftat sort of science to we vjsntv" "Who should do it and how 
should they and their activities be controlledV5? # perhaps tse 
compromise and the control c a n  h e supplied in terms of the
'Technological fothodology whose system, subject to feedback,
Is constrained by possibility and not by power. If the qualities
of suck systematisation can be recognised, fear may be eliminated 
or at least reduced*
The development of a technological methodology oriented
towards social-science may also be feared by sociological
conservationists who see the existence of what they call a 
"technology gap" between geographical and political power 
groupings and wish to seek for alternatives other than the 
technological for that very reason. They ask whether we should 
allow our society to be shaped by the inevitability of
technological advance. It is therefore necessary to try to. 
still such attacks as those made by the French social pkilospher
Jacques ijlilul who sees naivete aid arrogance• in men who outside 
their 0 labor at or iee" are capable only of trivia* This seems to 
be reinforced, by such philosophical observations as that of 
'winch (16; who sees "science as one of the chief shibboleths 
of the present age, this is bound to make the philosopher 
unpopular." winch admittedly does not expressly include 
technology in this attack but probably from omission altogether 
of such a theme which may not have occurred to him to explore. 
Such criticisms seem to arise from the position we have tried 
to stress as being so common, namely the confusion of techniques 
with technological methodology, bo the argument does not go, 
probably from ignorance, to its full extent where it might be 
more favorably disposed to the technological methodology, 
but stops short at a mere discussion of "machinery" which leads
/ v j k v J r
inevitably to the materialistic arguemta* supported by valid 
criticisms of particular techniques.
There has been a very recent attempt to pose an alternative 
strategy, differing from our proposal, by; Benton in his 
"IMlosopMcal Foundations of the Three sociologies" (17) where he 
assesses that his approach rejects the humanist severance of 
natural and social science while not embracing wholeheartedly 
the positivist conception of the unity of science. His approach 
is self admittedly epistemological and rests on his exposition 
of a materialistic theory of knowledge deriving support from 
Althusser {18} whom he quotes and followsbso - (p.171}
ffI cannot prove that materialism is the only alternative 
to positivism and naturalism but that it is an alternative 
should be sufficient to give it plausability as the basis
of a theory of knowledge in the light of the difficulties 
faced by both positivism and humanism"
Benton says that he hopes to avoid the d angers of the 
agnosticism of relativism by posing two alternatives, either 
by a theory that is built from "ground level so to speak by 
the gradual addition of increasingly higher level laws upon an 
observational basis through an inductive logic11 or by "ambitious 
conjecture and hypothesis" (p.77} We feel that our approach 
through our technological methodology and model, has something 
in common with Benton*s in its "ground level", "gradual addition" 
and "observational1 bases. However we give emphasis to 
tendency statements rather than laws which might coincide with 
the second alternative he poses of "mabitious conjecture and 
hypothesis".
However we strongly dispute that our approach leads to 
materialism. The Technological Methodology as we have been at 
pains to Insist is a rationale of approach based on the free
expression of the individual- methodologicians in consensus 
who are not subject to the material and corporate restraints 
imposed by a materialist philosophy, boei&X-seienoe, grounded in 
a technological methodology, will no more necessarily conduce 
to materialism than does its modern "natural" science counterpart.
Benton’s approach as it develops not only pushes him 
towards a materialistic viewpoint but becomes an even nakedly 
political stance e.g. p 192 "science may be objective but it is 
never neutral in the struggle between the 0100003" and, p 191,
"the foundation of a new science is of great political Importance."
These tendencies seem to ari^e from several am in strands 
in Benton’s thinking. First, in his overall approach as 
displayed in the title of hie work "philosophical Foundations 
of the Three sociologies", we note the use of the term sociology 
rather than social science which is a matter of concern that we 
shall expand on later. Second, this Is reinforced by the 
inclusion in his index of 16 references to sociology and none to 
social science. Third, his introduction is dedicated to students 
of "sociology". Fourth, he decides, in the manner of sociology 
as we shall interpret if, that in establishing his base he will 
attend to collectives such as "is a student", "is on the dole*
(p 115} rather than to individuals who may as we stress, in 
free choice freely projected, be less necessarily oriented 
towards materialistic interpretations than collectives in the 
Marxist position he supports in his concluding paragraph*
whether our base of individual perception in our 
application of the methodology to socxal-science will be considered 
as materialistic philosophically is a matter that we shall in due
course endeavour to refute but in Benton’s approach we read a 
lack of attention to the'other elements in social-science than 
19th century sociology affords, the Instruments of which
currently make possible a projection of individual preference. 
Vie also read a deference to the "Marxian project of a natural 
science of history* which seems outside our orbit.
Relevance of the Technological Methodology 
and its model to Social-Science
We xiQv* propose the significant forward step for our 
thesis of suggesting the particular position of sociaX-seienee
vis-a-vie the model we have presented. Indeed the social-science 
technological model might be considered as the paradigm case of 
the model since the individual is the broadest aspect of the 
"soil of observation*1 or "ground level” of Peigl and Beenton* 
while the technological metfeodologician offers a specific and 
limited case* The individual is expert in his total humanity 
and as such might be considered m  technologist of his own 
situation but this me feel is an overemphasis which would be 
better served by suggesting that the social^scleace technological 
model not only participates in the technological methodology 
but is fundamental to it* In this way the socialise!ence 
model in its progressions of refinement and improvement and 
accession to new areas of possibilityf may lead the way in the 
field of technological methodology, in association with "science1 
and philosophy.
It may by some be felt perverse to ground a study of 
social-science so firmly on the Individual. But me feel, as 
Bha^sker understands, that it is vital to approach society from 
the viewpoint of the individual. This attitude possibly reflects 
a revulsion from the corporate standpoint which has in much recent 
thinking tended to submerge the individual. While such s s Bhaeker 
reject "methodological indlvu&iism” because they feel that if poses 
too neglectful an attitude towards the social, they admit the 
importance of the reciprocal exchange between the individual and 
tiie social and place some degrees of emphasis on the former.
We suggest that in an investigation of social-science in
toto it is correct in its contemporary setting to work to 
"bring the humans back in” (Homans) and consider what those 
human individuals would have their society be, rather than 
attempt to impose a developed structure and movements of the 
social on the totality of individuals, either by edicts from 
power or by some invoked inevitable course of "natural" or 
"historic" events*
we do not argue whether or not society is itself in some 
way an individual in Hegelian terms, nor whether the philoepher- 
king solution of the llatonists if the good, but we would redress 
any failures to emphasise the prime importance of individuals 
in laying the foundations of a healthy socialisefence and of 
s technological methodology* This is particularly in keeping with 
the traditions of British .Philosophy*
In discussions of methodological individualism it is not 
necessary to go so far m  the Hayek/popper contention that 
societies and institutions do not exist but are mere constructs. 
They "exist" in the sense that they are a matter to receive 
attention but v*e hold that they are subject to the subterranean 
and protean movements of the totality of individuals on whose 
"soil" they are based ant for whom they exist and not vice versa. 
Even if the contra case could be substantially argued in chicken 
and egg fashion,, then recent strong emphases on societal facts 
leads one to think that there may be an imbalance to be 
redressed and that such correction is pointed to end made 
possible by the technological methodology* For example, it may 
have been so that f&andelbaun^s "irreducible societal fact" of 
"class" was only a suitable tool in a system not yet able to 
cope with multiplicities of individual instance*
kandelbaum claims (19) that "if it be the case as I wish 
to claim that societal facts are as ultimate es are psychological 
facts, then those concepts which a re used to refer to the forms 
or organisation of a society cannot be reduced without remainder 
to concepts which only refer to the thoughts and actions of specif1 
individuals.H^e$ibson (20) considers that M though statements 
about social structure are constantly made, it may still be the 
case that they can be elucidated in terns of statements about 
individuals and interaction between individuals" without 
succumbing to psychologism. Bill (21} contends that "all 
phenomena of society are phenomena of human nature" and
Popper (22) “actions of groups are to be understood, in terms of 
the actions of individuals", bo while such as ftao&elbaum 
either equate "society" with "individual" or give precedence to 
the former, we present our model with the support of a large body 
of philosphical thinking which show societal facts as constraints
which refer back to the individual, emerge from and do not impose
on the "grsss roots" or "ground soil" and cannot be considered on
since
a mathematical basis of summation and remoinder/1lie±% emergence 
arises at different levels. It may well be that the so-called 
"societal facts" emergent in the processes feed back to the roots 
and the soil and are there absorbed and digested, to extend the 
metaphor, and through euoh vital feedback engender a revised or 
renewed and refreshed, individualism. ■ ouch seems close to 
Relinosslii*© position (23) "the true problem is not to study how 
human life submits to rule© - it simply does not; the real problem 
is how the rules become adapted to life."
All this seems founded in Russell*s reference to human 
knowledge (2^)and his finding that "individual percepts ©re the 
basis of all our knowledge and. no method exists oy which we can 
begin with data which are public" and Hayek (25) "There is no other
way towards an understanding of social phenomena but through 
an understanding of individual^ actions." so our grounding 
seems.indeed consensual with the possible refinement of something 
like Hampshire’s recessive "I" which is a free agent capable of 
standing back from itself through the exposure to the feedbacks 
of possibility, error, suitability and accepted ethical 
justification (26).
This might seem to leave to social-science a merely 
resichual instead of a dominant study but such a construction 
needs refinement. If the stuff of individual choice, election, 
decision and direction, subjected to the correctional feedbacks 
which me have emphasised and the use of which will be demonstrated
in the technological methodology and model as applied to social- 
science, then such stuff will be seen to be the very ontological 
matter of that science and our very emphasis will not spell a 
denigration of soei&l-seieace but its enhancement when emergent
from the individual, buck an approach and such m  attitude will
differ
/from approaches which seem to oppose individual and society and 
possibly come close to M e m  smith’s summation (2?) "In the 
great 1chess board* of human society every single piece has a 
principle of motion of its own, altogether, different from that 
which the legislature might chuse (sic) to impress upon it.
If these two principles concede and act in the same direction, 
the g aiae of human society will go on easily and harmoniously 
and is very likely to be happy and. successful* If they a re 
opposite or different the game will go on miserably and the 
society must be at all times in the highest degree of disorder#” 
The Kantian man "as end in himself11 and never means may also be 
invoked as parallel to our case.
when J*b.l?lill Bays -that the laws of the phenomena of
society are and c an be nothing but the 1gv?s of the actions
and passions of human beings united together in the social state,
we eould agree with the qualification that we would substitute 
tendency statements for laws* Pratt advances the c riticiem that 
the actions of individuals are different in crouds, a viewpoint 
that underpins the w hole fabric of social psychology* But this 
in no way faults the Gillian contention, since inherent in 
individual "actions” and "Passions" will be participant potential 
crowd reaction syndromes for we nowhere wish to consider the 
individual in cruooe like isolation but in the milieu of his 
present environment* Pratt and others may be afraid that if the 
study of the individual reduces to psychology that there will be”no 
room for sociology ** which would thereby become something of a 
"bogus enterprise*” This we'would deny* While we shall in what 
succeeds certainly endeavour to diminish and restrain many of the 
expectations from and claims for sociology and while we see grave 
danger from falling into the common trap of equating sociology 
with social science, yet we do recognise the necessary 
enterprise of sociology in its study of groupings*
That socialiseience la for the individual and not the 
individual for aocial-science , leads us to attempt to analyse 
and possibly to simplify what has often been seen to be the 
considerable complexity which attends any philosophical 
investigation of the relationships between individual and society* 
Individuals have a clear and recognisable existence for our 
purposes, whose individual perceptions, volitions, choices and 
int entions .are more clearly discernible that those of "society1 
which, except in our terms of discrete individuals in totality, 
is a vague concept. It may well be as Bhasher requires that
social things arid society may be conceived to iiave an “existence” 
apart from the concepts that agents possess of them. But an 
acceptance of this nil! not demolish our position which emphasises 
the primacy of the individual and. is not incompatible with the 
constant revision of conceptual tools and their applications 
which we see as the moot important built-in ingredient of our 
technological methodology as applied to social^science. Bhasfeer*s 
“agents” in our terms will be the sum of individuals and not of 
group sociologists endeavouring to produce an entity which 
confuses rather than clarifies the inter-relationship of
individuals.
oo we propose to let
1 * 2?
represent for brevity the individual and non-socicl aspects of 
the individual and
i>**£
the social. It is clear that even those most obsessed by the 
priority of society will not deny that there exists aspects of 
the belt that are private 9 personal and non-social. This will not 
deny that 1-p may have been and may still be affected* even 
constrained and altered by We try to establish a balance
between the two aspects which gives room for that Freedom which 
is an essential part of our philosophical arguments.
The Individual, v;e propose, must be accorded the free 
right to elect and choose in the context of his consciousness of* 
sl^ertness to and sensitivity towards the possible constraints 
which will be imposed on such initial choice in the interests 
of others. The constant feedback which we attribute to the 
Technological Model as applied to social-science might be
considered as the adjuster of initial responses to the total 
"mechanism” of the model, in a manner not far from the ethics of 
other-regarding philosophies, he propose no self-indulgent 
individual licence but such free choices as the totality 
of tools* probes and extensions of human capacities* acting 
through the model, make apparent to the electing individual.
V?e concede that there will be considerable variants in 
the relationships of 1-P to s-f in individuals, as Brodbeck 
points out (28) who will vary in their responses from idio­
syncratic, introvert, self-sufficiency in which I-p will be
strong, to socialising* extrovert, eo-operants in which H-p 
may be conceived to preponderate* In any society there will be
those who from defect or from choice will be considered as mainly 
or totally s-p. A whole gamut of v ariante will appear and be rec­
ognisable. however, in the modern technological methodology 
exemplified in our model as applied to social-science, there is 
no problem for the projection of individual choice considered as 
I-F rectified or adjusted by b-p since we shall not need to resort 
to category, class ox1 norm which procedures have made the 
erstwhile social science so wooden and inflexible and patently 
aberrant from reality, he shall'have passed beyond the Orusoe 
conventions of classical economists end the high-level conventions 
of utopian philosophers to the reality of the totality of 
individual preference. I-f/s-p are not dichotomous but the 
reactions and rectifications between them are united in the see If.
benee datum approaches which must be considered basic 
to our approach from individuals with choice, are sometimes seen 
to be philosophically outmoded. However such as Ayer continue to 
"utilise sense datum terminology” (30) for want of better.
Bussell's dicta that (31; “individual percepts are the basis 
of all our knowledge and no method exists by which we can begin 
with data which © re public to many observers11% that (32) "Science 
consists largely of devices for overcoming initial lack of 
perception on the assumption that perception gives a probable 
approximation to truth* that (33) "hatters of fact that lie 
outside my experience can be made to seem doubtful unless there 
is argument showing that their experience follows from matters of 
fact within my experience together with laws (we would interpolate 
tendency statements) of whose certainty I feel reasonably 
convinced*11 All of these dicta seem still to stand and we take
them as valid assumptions for our thesis*
However dicta such as the above and stands based thereon 
must accepti first* the rejection with itusscll of any tendency 
to undiluted solipsism* second* the a amission of the need in 
social-sciencc* as possibly in other sciences* to accept the 
replacement of "law” by "tendency statement"* third, the - 
acceptance of Polaayifs reminder (3U) that we* as social-scientist 
and as individuals in company with others, can only fulfil our 
obligation to serve the truth to the extent of our natural 
abilities as developed by education and within the limitations 
of our formative milieu* we a tress that the development of the 
tools and probes of which rolanyi takes constant cognisance 
diminish the defects of such abilities*
bo while the argument from Individualism must not be too 
stark and. there m y  be indeed “societal facts", yet the real 
matter is not of the one over against the other* not the 
insoluble chicken and egg argument of which is or is not prior 
to the other, but the development of a balanced and constantly
redressed relationship between I-p and B-f in the same 
individual.
Buch an approach may seem close to wisdom's 
"transindividualism" which allows equal weight in principle or 
any agreed proportion of weights to individuals or the societal 
constraints governing the course of individual life in a group 
or society. It may well be that the "agreed proportion of weights* 
has recently become out of balance and needs adjusting in favour 
of the Individual*
If l~r is so redressingly weighted, then B~p in Its 
constraining* restraining and revisionist capacity, may be seen 
to be pruned and simplified to proportions which it is c apablc of 
sustaining in the light of the adequacy of the tools* probes* 
methodologies with models, available* I-p both from its sense 
of need* requirement* choice and movement and from the tsciticity 
of Its understanding within.its judgments which are always
personal (35) will remain the prime dynamic and feeding ground 
for o-r*
It should be stressed that this argument is not that of
the economist/political scientist in Hayek, for example* who
seems to be arguing in his approach to what has come to be
called "methodological individualism” and against which Bhasker
takes issue in its undiluted form, strong economic* political
arguments* Hoyek's Is a case for and against state involvement
in the economy considered in a narrow sense* He and others like
him who have developed their approaches to a broader social
scientism from an original specialist economic approach* may
indeed lay claim to their later wider interpretation of the term 
“economic” in terms of welfare and standards of living. But
they seem not truly to have shed their origins and are also 
constricted by their cultural end historical backgrounds to
reaction against dictatorial political systems as explored, 
for example, in hopper5s "Open society".
he vould hope that our a rgutnent would be seen as 
broadening into philosophical setting which views the entire 
individual in hio private and social aspects, not limited to 
the political or economic, at the very base of a model which 
reflects his ultimate self-controlled driving force within our 
methodology, be are not partner to the “free market” concepts 
of the laisaes fair© economists of the 19th century and. later, 
nor do m  closely identify with the "hidden hand” of Adam smith 
as that has come to be interpreted. The “hand” and the “market” 
seem to be conceptual structures prloriy erected, which impose
their weights on those very Individual choices they claim to 
exult. We are probably closer to the "spontaneous order” of 
Hsyefc and Polanyi which suggests no such imposition.
V*e may thus be seen to have avoided the anarchistic 
tendencies which the opponents of methodological individualism 
seem most to fear* Perhaps it will suffice to use the tool-word 
"individualism” coded as X-i? redressed and refined by our 
methodology in its relationship with b-p. The individual, human 
so seen under- the aegis of the technological methodology as 
demonstrated through its model and. attendant tools or probes* may 
lay claim to new capacities or the more effective use of existing 
ones and enhance their potentials.
o-r may be seen to be concerned with a residuum thrown up
by immediate incapacity of the individual to be able or to wish 
to make elections based on his needs interpreted in the broadest
sense und spanning beyond the material.
The purpose of the application of the Technological 
Methodology and Model to social-science will be the exploration, 
the guidance and the rectification of the elections or choices 
made freely by the individual. It Is suggested by some social- 
scientists (36) that there are no identifiable basic human needs 
from *ohich to explore such choice. We refute this argument which 
possibly stems from a cross-cultural relativism which, in accord 
with Vi inch in this particular, we leave out of our current 
considerations* Admittedly the classifications of need will be 
broad, capable of wide inclusiveness and subsumptions: they may 
be considered as tools or probes within the model (37).
Oaltung approaches this matter as follows, although admittedly his 
case is mainly oriented towards developing countries*(38) 
“Development is defined as development of people, 
not as the production of goods and services, nor their 
distribution, or as.institution building, nor as 
structural transformation, nor as cultural development, 
nor as ecological balance* All these necessary
social (or environmental In the broad sense) conditions or 
as
means, but development of people in society. This, in turn, 
is seen as the satisfaction end further development of basic 
human needs. This concept is In itself highly problematic 
and a major research task will be to understand it better*
In any ease, “basic need” will be understood to include both 
material and non-material needs, and bo far they liave been 
identified under four main headings of security, welfare,
identity and freedom.”
While we do not wish to follow Galtung's consultation 
document any fur the r we are satisfied to note his acceptance or
the laentiflability of basic needs even in croes~eulturaX 
conditions^ and although they differ in emphasis from those we 
now present. Schematically we suggest five areas of human 
individual need on which preferences and choices will he made, 
all tensed between lri/s-1 in the manner we have previously 
suggested.
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It might be possible to reduce these by the elision of 
Food with warmth and security with Companionship but we see 
no great advantage in ouch reduction, except that the model will 
possibly have to be applied to each area in turn and then to 
an adjustment between them. fhis we suggest ©ill have to be
a matter in the hands of the cybernetic systematise^ in 
collaboration with the socialiselent1st.
he emphasise that the elements of the above schema are 
not classifications rooted in materialism which has for so 
long constrained the work and the repute of the social s dentist. 
Vie might turn to the founding fathers of economics (5k) and 
social science (Aristotle) to see more clearly the ethical and 
moral concern which a re certainly not excluded from and are 
probably magistral iB the above schematic elements.
Xhese five elements of choice v*ill satisfy a criterion 
of simplicity, establish m  epistcmological base for the I-p/a-P 
exposition, afford a basis for ethical judgment of individual 
choice, reasonable grounds for their eventual possible and useful
evaluation, thus permitting our system to measure up to the 
philosophical requirements that Ihahur posits. If for these five 
heads we can find adequate tools or probes and systems for 
assembling, calculating, measuring, assessing, classifying, 
sorting, selecting, extending and projecting their data, in 
company with the cybernetic systemstisers who will have to be 
willing co-partners with the social-scientlets, then we may find a 
surer base for cocial-scienco based on residua from X-3?, than on 
one with wider and more confused plans. Adequacy of all this 
largely rests on an attempt to develop Quality from Quantity, 
the importance of which we now explore.
!JThe problem of confirmation can be looked on 
os a quantitative problem or as a qualitative
problem although these two viewpoints are by 
no means mutually exclusiven* 
bo, H*Brown writing in 1979 (35) and we would like to press the 
point he is there making to the possible extent of seeing 
quality and. quantity merging under the aegis of a technological 
methodology as demonstrated in our model for social-science.
Berner {36} reminds us of the age-old utterance - :,It 
is quality rather than quantity that matters as against the 
fact tlibt in classical economicb it was quantity that became almost
omnipotent* However advocating gethemafica without numbers (37) 
iiem&ny and others postulate those graphical and geometrical methods 
which may be seen as to approach the qualitative* Although they 
admit their issue of quantity to quality is not near complete
solution, workers such as Berner, shrug shoulder and continue in 
the search by investigating mathematically or empirically the 
intermediate, mixed or deviant or limiting cases* fhe current
convergence of mathematics and science on multi-dimensional 
problems was made possible by the breakthrough of the idea of a 
Hmanifold of n-Simona ions51 by Riemann and the matrix system which 
involves the formal arrangement of qualitative variates in such 
a manner as to g onerate significant numerical values and permitting 
the ranking of those arxlEEE variates thus approaching very much 
closer to qualitative analysis*
Insufficient of a mathematician to delve further into 
these possibilities, we defer to the concern, the interests and the 
hopes of aiany workers in this field to- whom we advert in addendum C*
Increasing data and the development of new mathematical 
awareness of the need to refine quantitative approaches* lead 
the sociol-scientiat to think* that for M g  territories et least* 
there is increasing possibility of a fruitful approach to what 
used to be separately called nqualitative” and therefore less 
efficiently reflective of reality* in contrast with f'quantfrtive” 
in its blunt primitive statistical uses* If v,e admit the 
subsumption of our refined data handling tools and probes 
within the technological methodology as exemplified by the model
applied to soci&l-scieace * we may surely hope for a complete
revolution in the quality/quantity syndrome*
• we have now presented socialHScience as the simplified 
ordering and mathematical and systematic technological monitoring
of whatever emerges from individual choice* whether largely 
retained as J**f or shed end re-routed through w»q-* In the data 
collection.of individual election and choice there must be a 
completeness that will be related to quality together with a 
strict systematisation that will enable the crucial feedback 
leading to readjustment and reassessments of the input and detect 
any error in the process* ‘This is to be the part played by 
systematic cybernetics to which we shall play later great attention
All this 1*111 encompass a complete revolution in the 
current assessments of individual need based on SI-1 socio- 
economic-polltea1 participation in terms of the blunter 
instruments of
formal votes
referenda on single issues 
opinion polls on limited samples 
questionnaires with leading enquiries 
all of which will appear as very inadequate methods in comparison 
with the qualitative sensitivity of the technological methodology 
as applied to social-ucieuee and as we illustrate in our model*'
There may be overriding outcomes of social choice which 
may seem to conflict with individual preference of first
expression, however we base our argument for the priority of
I~r on an optimism of approach to the integrity of individual 
choice, enlightened self-interest and other-regarding stances 
in the vein of the idealist schools of such as kousseau* m o t  
and Oreen* with the additional pressure or assurance of the 
directives of the feedback which will make apparent the 
illogicalities or even impossibilities of certain choice.
such an approach comes close to the declaration of the 
emergence of a general will from individual wills* towards which 
there will be a tendency to conform* not through the imposition 
of a structure or a rule but by an ever growing acceptance of 
the necessities - of the situation anil made clear by the feedbacks 
which register the total capacities of the model.
A parallel strand in this approach rests within the
democratic model* in which free choice * free expression of
choice* opinion and preference are the bases of a self-imposed
moral imperative - the moral lav- within* Arrow argues (3b)
that the democratic model so expressed has much in common with
the s tatistleal pooling of judgments of a £ roup of everts to
arrive at a best judgment. In our case* the individual is seen 
as expert in his own cause but that cause is subject and will be
subjected to the fee&baciis or possibility as evidenced by the 
technological model*
Ifee delicate and complex: mechanisms offered by the 
technological methodology illustrated in the model for Bocial-scieil 
with its current end foreseeable apparatus of tools end probes, 
will break down if too many parameters of social constraint 
are imposed on individual preferences not sufficiently trusted 
by the soclai~scientiat to be made with intelligent self-awareness9 
compassion and alertness to the.signals of error, or of 
change of circumstance which needs to be heeded and indicated 
by the feedbacks through the system.
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Level one with tools of word, I-P j X~s /
concept, primitive \  \
computerisation e*g* 
by telepkone-in, t.v.
speak back, referenda
Level one of the Technological model for i:-oeial~beience 
demonstrates its grounding in the individual Person {I/p:s/p) 
v*} io can express through the methods available * preferences or
choices arising from the basic needs indicated in our schema of 
need and expressed through the s ensa which *.e affirm as our 
elementary postulate9 without leading to materialism#
Level Two demonstrates .the possibility and the necessity 
for the refinement of data derived from Level one to a form 
adaptable to syat©matisationf translation and cybernetic processes 
for the assessment of the possibility of Level one preference 
attainment#
Level . .Three demonstrates the subjection of the once refined 
date to further reassessment having regard to the constraints 
imposed by the specific parameters of political, economic* 
anthropological* sociological or ethics! origins#
Level Lour reflects the further reassessment of the 
possibility of attainment of expressed preferences which have
evolved through levels two and three* having regard to the control 
exercised oy boeial^bcience in its c. opacity as magistral to the 
ingredient sciences of Level Three with its need to sustain a
balance between them.
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Level Five leads the whole movement of the model towards as 
yet undeveloped aspects of its methodology and its apparatus which 
may have emerged incipiently through the trial of systematisetion*
The Technological Model as applied to social-science and
as we have demonstrated it, brings out the aim of soeial^sclence
ao here pi^fceived to act as the channel through which individual 
preference and choice nay be projected and resolved in the light 
of the possibility of their attainment when account has been 
tasen by the individual of restricting parameters* It is not a 
question of description v ersue prescription: it is the simple one 
of possibility* Tins position seems very close to that developed
s
toy Horn Barre and r.F*becord {39} where they reiterate the appeal 
1 have made to bring "the humans back in" «* "In general social 
behaviour is the result of the conscious self monitoring of 
performance toy the person himself, in the course of which he 
contrives to assess the meaning of the social situation in 
which he finds himself, end to choose amongst various rules ana 
conventions to act in accordance with his choice correcting this 
choice as further aspects of the situation make themselves clear 
to him*,}
The methodology with its concomitant model will toe
ideologically rather than rule driented and it will face aims and 
possibilities of limited temporality* Winch (itO) is so
concerned with rule orientation which he 'takes to toe the criterion 
of science that he fights shy of the predictions which he takes 
to toe the main aim of the socisl-scientiet# He says (p.9k}
,fuhat in fact one is showing, however, is that the 
central concepts which to dong to our understanding of 
social life are incompatible with concepts central to the 
activity of scientific prediction* When w e speak of the 
possibility of scientific prediction of socinld evelopraents 
of this sort, we literally do not understand what v;e are 
saying* We cannot understand it, because it has no cense*w
Vic do not place prediction so high on the priorities of the 
social-aclent1st as w inch might seem to do 'and, even if 
prediction were of importance perhaps Winch visualises too long a 
span for ouch.predictions* To be fair to him he is grounded in the 
eternal, universal, total temporal ana space span putloote of the 
philosopher, whereas the social^scientist warns more modestly 
from the basis of space and time scales that are much more 
limited, while not unmindful of the broader philosophic approach*
. fo use “teleologies!” in the manner of the social~seientist 
is not to deal in absolutes hut in restricted temporals.
Admittedly the reign of rule of law might be reduced in a manner 
seen by Boosng.uet (hi) as a
“tendency to reaction against mechanism which is going 
near to destroy the idea of the reign of law, and to 
enthrone the finite subject as the guide and master of 
nature and history* If this is rightly read, we ©hall 
have to recall the mechanist, along with bpinona, in the 
interests of history and the theory of religion*11 
£QS&ng.uelt a idealism might have excluded eociml-science from 
such s trieturea but we offer its tendency s tatements as palliative 
to the dismay which he seems to feel at the erosion of the word
If *| f,r if•Li-*, w *
oocla 1-science is not v-.ithout Its own brands of Idealism 
witness the many Utopias from Plato to those moderns who seek 
to establish ultimate© in practical fora in their day. We 
suggest that such Utopian visions are of too long a term for 
social-science and become, at some marking point along the way 
of probable possibility, no longer within the purview of social- 
science in a more limited aspect, outfall within the metaphysics
which gives guiding directives or advices to soclal-scicnce. 
whether the stepped attainments of eocisl-science, adjusted 
constantly in the light of circumstance and rates of change 
and aided by adaptations and developments of tools, probes, or 
models, could eventually coincide.with those of the ideologically 
oriented metaphysician, can only be speculated but such an 
eventual coincidence can at least be distantly envisaged.
Ideal© as pull and mechanisms as push might provide a double
d>ch
harness from yet another outmoded tdircotomy which could serve 
the metaphysician and the social-scientist in harxaony and not 
in conflict.
Teleology which is explanation by reference to purpose 
or end is sometimes described pace Aristotle as final causation 
in contrast with explanation by reference to e fficient causation.
It was the mechanistic explanations of the 16th and 17th centuries 
which led to an emphasis on the e ff icient eSeee rather than the fin**' 
cause and furthermore led the biological an&logists to consider^ 
biological organisms a© kinds of efficient machines, so Taley (b2)
It is still in dispute in the biological sciences whether the 
processes there o an be explained in purely mechanistic 
or physio~ehemeial terms or whether even (there the problem of 
structure, function and organisation necessitate some kind of 
teleology. (k3)*
while not wishing to revert to the older style mechanism©. 
we do not wish to use the metaphors of biology to explain social- 
science, he do however place considerable emphasis on the part • 
that purpose, seen in terms-of the Individual, plays in social-scienc 
and hence emphasise the tsinological orientation of our model 
in tex’ms of limited time and space scales.
If, as the rule-oriented philosophers argue, the rule, 
the theory or the law is paramount, then the a rguments put forward 
by Feyer&bend, for example, (I4I4) cannot m  sustained* Theories do 
not rest on "established facts" for when we adopt a new theory, we 
at the same time, alter the concepts of such as “warm” and the "fact 
from which we have started* while it is sometimes suggested .that 
science progresses by inventing now theories in relation to which 
older theories appear as special-applications so that, for example,
ke*vton,s physical theory is simply a narrower theory than Binstein1 a 
Feyerabend, following iiuhjte? and Topper, argues that new theories are 
inconsistent with the old and involve their rejection* he now, he 
argues, work within a new ontology ana a corresponding change in the 
meaning of whatever descriptive terms such e s "warm11 that w© 
choose to continue to employ* Feyerabend admits that a theory or 
a rule map have b m n  so widely accepted that we find it hard to 
imagine any way of describing what we observe except in t erms of 
that rule* But it is a defect in science so Fcyerabend argues 
that it should ever be committed to a single theory or rule* 
scientists ought always to be working with alternatives ae a 
protection against dogmatism. Thiscertainly does not dispose of 
the efficient cause but It leave© a much wider gate open to the 
ideological explanation than that offered by 1 inch. Possibly 
everyday concepts, rules, habits and "laws" derived from assimilated
scientific theories, are a little like uittegnatein1© ladder - to 
be thrown away when once climbed. It might be conceded to 
otrawson, that some are indeed the coping stones of our thinking 
and cannot be dispensed with* Hers we are concerned with 
establishing a balance in favour of the t eleological and drawing 
attention to the self-adjusting possibilities of our model.
Winch takes M s  concern with rule orientation beyond the 
2one of,, "all science" into that of all "meaningful behaviour”
“1 have claimed that the analysis of meaningful 
behaviour must allot n control role to the notion 
of a rule* that all behaviour which is meaningful 
(therefore all specifically human behaviour) is ipso- 
facto rule-governed" (p.51/2)
We claim that in this reading Winch is largely coloured by his 
historlcism, by hie acceptance of the elier fashioned idea of 
science as law discovery and by his emphasis on habitual!ty.
He drives close to describing the alternative of individual 
choice "an the pointless behaviour of a heserk lunatic (p*f?8) 
although he rests his more detailed argument on that of the 
"anarchist" whose eschewing of explicit norms does not eliminate 
the idea of a rule from the description of his behaviour because, 
as he makes a point of not being governed by explicit rigid norms, 
this itself presupposes the notion of a kind of rule.
Again we emphasise that v.e do not argue whether or not 
there are rules governing meaningful behaviour but whether the
adherence to rule has been too rigid to the detriment of the
free goal oriented choice of the individual, admittedly subject to
behavioural regularities rather than to lunatic anarchism.
While winch shies sway from prediction of oven short term 
possibly because he has little cognisance of modern methods of 
ensuring the validation of prediction over those short periods, 
he says that the rule while nos specifying any determinate
outcome does limit the r ange of possible alternatives and the. 
rejection of others, until such time as it again becomes 
necessary to interpret the rule in the light of new conditions.
Thus he really does seem to want his cake of indeterminism with 
his eaten meal of rule control* The social-scientist accepts 
the limitations of rule In very short term limits whereas Winch 
fails to enter into much development of M s  time-scale except 
when he uses the examples of composing music, the b evelopment 
of religions , the playing of football onci the d ovelopmeat of
jass as examples of being unable to determine the “outcome of 
the historical trend*M
The gentian rule of the "moral lax within" does not 
conflict with the postulate of freedom for man as end-in-himself . 
and the autonomy of his will as free suggests the goals of the 
starry heavens rather than an earthbound servitude controlled or 
limited by man made laws with the s ernhlanee of eternal, immutable 
natural necessity*
If might be argued that the methodology, the model and 
the apparatus we present are themselves gua rule, providing as 
they do parameters within which choice will be realised* However, 
invol: ing a i-opperlan caution towards theories which stand to be
disproved, we propose that the methodology, the model and
the apparatus we present contain within themselves ingredients
for celf-rectif 1 cation, improvement and modification in the light
of the shortcoming, deficiencies, errors and lacks that arc 
demonstrated constantly by the activity of feedback.
recapitulating on our argument for applying The Technological 
lethodolagy with Model to boois1-ocfence with emphasis on the 
possible primacy of such application, we have argued that the
purpose of the application is to explore, guide and adjust the 
elections and choices made by individuals which are the grounding 
of the model. We believe that the technological methodology 
permits the possibility of coping with the totality of individual 
choices, elections or preferences. v#e believe that it therefore . 
increases the possibility of free individual choices, elections 
or preferences whereas group or class theories tend to diminish 
such individual freedoms. There are two main points here t
(1) the use of group or class theories restricts freedom as It 
fails to admit the prime importance of the Individual as I-T *
(2) the use of the technological methodology illuminated by its 
model can be considered as throwing greater light on individual 
relationships without the blurring effect caused by the use of 
group, class or sample approaches.
• we have argued that ethical and other philosophical 
considerations as, for example, the aesthetic and episteraologie&l, 
can be built into the technological methodology and model in the 
same way tm the more limited political stance is built into marxist 
and some recent sociological approaches, although we have 
deliberately eschewed venturing into the practical applications 
overseen by the socie.l-seience technological methodology, we 
might point to a very simple example of the care that the working 
technologist has for ethical considerations in the rule that civil 
and mechanical designers use for steel & truciures* “include a 
safety factor of lj.n
which. exert their influence at
Level Three of the 
Lodel
'ue vviBh to set out the components of Goeial-bcience which 
will exert their influence at Level Three of our model* bineh 
in his approach to the social eciencea seems in some measure 
unaware of their scientific content andof4 the details of their 
contributory areas. That he quotes the platitude of their infancy 
is no reonon for ignorance as to their content. It is not in 
infancy that we mist look for confusion hut in the inadequacies 
of approach and methodology. Aristotle as long ago as his LtMcs 
makes clear that he is there investigating exactly the same 
fundamental matters that the modern socialise lent 1st is engaged in# 
The whole of Allies Logic Book VI is concerned with the present
theme of the need to develop and improve the social eciencos by 
logical and philosophical methodology end he there quotas 
Gonaorcet who published in 1733 on the “backward state“ of the 
social sciences* Gome infancy* Winch's following tangential 
discussion of the natural versus non-natural approaches side- 
stops the uncertainties he has, with many others* of the very 
stuff of the matter with which ha proposes to deal.
It is then frequently unclear what even its practitioners
mean by soeia1-scienoe: what is included and what omitted
from its sub-divisions. Inclusiveness and g enerality have often
stretched too far and permitted spilling over into what might
better bo served by the so-called “humanities" courses and 
programmes of study and research* Restraint and neater
specialisation may be what is needed by the social- 
scientist within his methodology ana his model.
after the revival of interest in the study of secular 
society which may be traced to the Xbth century Enlightenment 
itself stemming from the flowering of rationalism In France 
and the pursuit of moral philosophy in Scotland * the initiative'
gradually passed to Germany and. other Continental countries where 
t he “specialist'1 sub-divisions of the social sciences began to 
emerge - economics, anthropology, sociology, political science
and social psychology. At the s ame time there were moves 
towards grand syntheses at the hands of Comte, spencer and M&rx.
Thus v;c see typified in the social sciences the 
perennial battle between specialisation and generalisation 
common to the pursuit of knowledge in other fields* Does this 
parallel the recurrent philosophical theme of the one and the 
many whose origins stem beck to the xlatonic Dialogues In 
philosophical debate?
Vum t are the factors in this recurring oscillation?
Bo they stem from a need for occasional synthesis of disparate 
sectors which have become too remote from one another? Is it a
symptom of the t endencies sometimes to seek the broad sweep of
“common sense18 philosophies and at others to rely on closer and
more profound investig&tione such as those of the linguistic
school? Is the one the function of some intellectuals and the
other of another breed or do all episfemologlsts wish to take
part in both emphases at varying stages? bill the “bridge"
technique advocated by such as Fulton and Thakur suffice? ' 
Whatever the answers to these and similar questions about the
genera1isa tion/spec iai i s& tion issue, it is almost certain 
that -.ve are An, or Just emerging from, a period of 
loose geaeralie&tion in social science* we advance our
technological metkodoXogic&X thesis r.hich ineorpr&tee elements 
of social science of recent origin*
lor our purposes v/e here define Suuirxx&Nox as 
magistral to and cmibrasive of the specialised participator 
social sciences %hlch for our working hypothesis v.e take to be •
Anthropology
hihxcs {pace Aristotle and smith for example)
Economics
Political science
statistical science
Communications Theory
Cybernetics and systems Theory
sociology
in similar manner to that of Philosophy in its magistral 
position in relation to its subdivisions*
it is necessary to make three comments on the a bove
A* sociology must be scenes participant and not synonymous 
with sociaX-science*
B. History is a eliberstely exeludec and we make reference to 
this exclusion in Addendum E.
G* Gocial psychology has been excluded partly in deference 
to the Cambridge school and partly because in our 
emphasis on the individual we feel v.e have subsumed, 
what psychology, social or other, has to offer to 
our model*
There are indeed additional disciplines which will feed 
peripherally into social-science and thin needs no a rjguing since 
it is the sane for all areas of thinking* It is necessary for 
all to drmv their boundaries without rigidity end without closing 
all doors or neglecting all bridges.
The contributory disciplines of socisl-aeienee as 
enumerated will look for &wm binding link which will be provided 
by the v ery concept of social-science dust as philosophy' does 
in relation to ontology# epistemology and other of its special
areas. kmphasis on this aoei&l-science totality will cause to
be avoided the d angers of
a) its wholeness being attributed to its part 
is * g * so ciology
b) t m  practitioners of social/science% having no 
overriding methodology or model in mind, fulling 
foul of their own limited. specialisms and thus 
tending to tip the v easel of social-scieaco
towards the economics, anthropology, political science 
or sociology of their expertise end with insufficient 
capacities for overall consensual judgments*
If boehMgy is so frequently seen as equated with social 
science, v,e must look for reasons since such exposes as that of 
Winch are not isolated and there is a coiswon tend encyst o use
sociology as if it t vere synonymous with soc ial—s cience*
.-.dadttedly were the sociologist to act social-oeieniist there 
could be little complaint except in t ejprns of terminological 
inexactitude, which possibly stems from the translation of 
Germanic words from German philosophical settings* However, • 
v.e challenge its usage so on three important counts *
u. ghe sociologist is frequently even most commonly
of humanistic origin. T'he .London scliool of beonomioe 
■and political science him greet difficulty for example 
in finding entrants with sufficient minimal 
qualifications in science and aathemtics* This has
led to the commonly expressed complain in of the 
excessive verealisation and even verbosity of 
sociologists v;hich -by a non^sequltox* in laid at the 
door of its ma^or social-science with which the 
minor sociology is confused*
b* If the sociologist as so often seems to b e the cs.se, 
wishes to participate in disparate and multitudinous 
studies of practice which would better be termed 
"social studies5' and in terms of which finch often 
deals, then it will be impracticable for M m  to 
master hie own and all other specialist fields of 
social-science.
c. There exists indeed ti field which needs more than
cursory exploration and which could form the sole and
sufficient study of the sociologist and that is the 
study of groupings. It is possible that ibis study 
could well be extended for purposes of comparison into 
non^antbropomorphic fields, The aggregations, 
congregations ana desecrations of individuals have 
been inadequately explored by sociologists because 
of their continued involvement with thinner layers 
of exploration and less profundity*
there there is an inability among specialists to
determine the core of their subjects, due most probably to 
vagueness of vocabularies anti concepts and an insufficiency 
of other tools, probes or models» there develops a feeling of 
dissatisfaction with their specialisms ana instead of s taying 
with them .and developing further apparatus , there arises
a tendency towards generalisation scratching at the surface of 
the problem and interest in subjects peripheral in which there 
can be little expertise* hant puts it thus (U5)
"Consistency is the highest obligation of a 
philosopher and yet is rarely found* The ancient 
Creeh schools afford more examples of it than m  
find in our sync re ti Stic age, when a certain shallow 
and dishonest system of coalition between 
contradeictory principles ie devised because it is 
more acceptable to a public which is satisfied to know 
a little about everything and at bottom nothing, 
thus playing the 3ack~of-all*-trades."
The records of universities show that many undergraduates 
munifeat such oiasatiefaction in the early stages of their 
courses which tendency umy stem from the generalising tendencies 
recently apparent in courses in the schools.
Among the very n  indeed, there may a rise so complete a 
mastery of own territories that the scholar feels Impelled to 
supplement them with others, but he cannot, especially in this
];a)Li oyXi Ji pe p eii.or&ice tj.iesi &Xjl.
Cross fertilisation of the disciplines prescribed by
Pulton (l|6) for example went mad in an attempt to "humanise" the
scientist and make scientifically literate the student of
humanistic subjects, which gulf originated in the classical/ 
scientific divide in the public schools of the 19th century*
Such generalising; proposals are very different from the bridge- 
building recommended by Thakur (h?) or x \Jii+ k#*!* a ’i'ijV Ai1 C2 *0^3 sensual 
approach, oven educational pro £. > i' V- n u2 i e s in koala and colleges 
swamped the curricula with such generalising thematic approaches
to say, The rreally, .herein evasions, duplications, contradictions 
and even some deliberate conditioning of students (da) arose either
from power interests of the instructors or from ignorance, iiuch 
generalising attempts at humble levels probably retained their 
damaging bias tree beyond the elementary & tapes% yet till were 
labelled !fsocial science".
However over against such g eneralising tendencies,'must be
set th *F Yj O L/Is I ble arrogance of the specialist, sav-bones end barber 
become surgeo n: market place tooth puller become dental surgeon 
are trite examples which we could proliferate. For our purposes 
we draw special attention to the specialist economist or political 
scientist or sociologist, who having become politician, projects 
his particular apparatus in isolation from the other social s cieaces.
The incipient historian is often c** * "1- £,,» Cl X -I- / . X j* X* w »  0* 1-i a process.
Faced by such, a double horned dilemma we shall rest our 
trust in xolanyinn consensus as a better ameliorator of any dangers 
stemming from specialisation, rather than in the superficialities 
of generalisation which have brought social-scisnee into its 
recent disrepute#
It might be a shed whether social-science and the social-
scientist as he pose the::- will be in the danger of power seeking
specialisation, he hope that our thesis is accepted as specialist
methodological capab&l&of I opperian ana v eriflcation tests as well
as relying on its inbuilt capacity for rectification through 
feedback, with these safeguards and with the recognition of
of its sub-divisions will insure against social-science 
bocoming a total opistecological generaliser or a blind
autocrat of the social sciences#
The placing of sociul-science in magistral position in 
relation to the participating sciences may avoid Ibe clanger of 
each participant taming over and staying the w bole and this not 
only in relation to sociology which might b e seen to pose the 
areatestcianger# with the best ethical will in the world and in 
spite of the Hayeica, iid&m umiihe, Physiocrats and the modern 
Scandinavian school of economists, economic science nazst not be 
permitted to claim adequacy with sooial-science for it ban too 
much of production of materials uiki commercialism in its make-up 
for the ends that social—soiewce in philosophical perspective must 
attempt to attain, Anthropology takes us into those territories 
of spacial relativism which we have undertaken for this study ana 
in company with «<inch to eschew, statistics provides the data of 
the e cience rather than its essence, however necessary that 
discipline may be to thew hole, ethics, in its present settings, 
may not be able to yield adequately to economics, data end their 
syateimiisaiion# A olitieal s cience seals in powers and forces 
which may pgrove overstrung for coops rant partnership with 
fellow sub-sciences without the guiding hand of eoci&l-scienee# 
uur inclusion of Oonraunicatione Theory among the social-scientlsts 
brings us admittedly to the peripheries of social-scisnce and can 
be paralleled with philosophic involvement with linguistics. 
However those areas of communicstions theories which a re 
essentially psrt of Systems Analysis and the techniques of 
computerisation we cannot exclude, venturing into peripheries 
must not permit the net of social-sciencc to be cast too wide.
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Be wish now to examine in some detail the probee# tools 
or apparatus of the Technological methodology - the component 
parts of the model which reflects the methodology in relation 
to social-scienee,
want did not see fit to go into the minutiae of his 
"spectacles1*, he assumed that the detail of the conception* 
invention# refinement, coloration and acceptance he taken for 
granted ss extension of hie metaphor. However me# in our present 
task, feel the need for further justification and elucidation 
of our metaplior so, without quitting our basic position of 
critical reasoning, me develop tills section on Tools, probes or 
Apparatus.
At this time me do not wish to consider the tool# probe 
or apparatus In the character of specific Instruments of a 
specific technique for we do not wish our adoption of the 
Technological methodology with its model to be seen e,s erecting an 
applied social science, be should indeed be fll-sGvised to 
advance a pro-conceived sterility for social-seienee but the 
applications of the methodology and its projection through the 
model will follow from an acceptance of its possible guidance 
through its tools, probes and. apparatus or critical persauelon,
rather than from ad hoc ana disparate investigations of "social 
problems11 which may need their own specific brands of tools# 
probes or apparatus for the establishment of their bases, we Go 
net wish to proceed from a summation of sueh individual specific 
approaches but from our magistral methodology and model.
If the Technological model for social-science may be held to 
araw together into a ayetern, the tools, probee or cppuratus of an
overriding methodology, those very elements will be considered 
an extensions of individual expertise whether of the examining 
methodologician or of the individual person who grounds the 
model as applied to social-seience.
Loth the individual aiothouologicion and tlie individual 
person will be' subject to the constraints of their cultural 
conventions and to those of their own education, scientific or 
other f x *■+>■ *4* <&. i«L «• 4^ W'. r i tr* personality, iron which* pace folaryi, they 
till be unable to escape, The s m tlioaologician till be grounded 
In scientific principles and M s  own technological rules m i d  
vision: he till take cognisance of philosophical guide lines 
and the guidance of philosophers thus concerning hiss oIf with the 
opistemological# ethical and aesthetics! considerations of which 
Thu bur speaks. All the while he will be concerned with a desire 
to "know how" as veil as to "k IniO** iii.lMi# vll4(J iLli Gil-Xib will bo 
particularly concerned with the apparatus, tools or probes at his 
disposal and which he may adapt, adjust and develop. In all this 
he rill be paralleled, in ranted specialist manner, by the 
individual -person at the root of the uoeisi-seienoe model in that 
both wxll oe using tiiexx* personai jnb-gcxaents Cf i iwi biliiies to do 
the right thing at fixe right time and in the right ray. 
i-* AI i ttf will be indicated tion which will feed
back signs of acceptance or rejection in terms of possibility*
dust as it may have been necessary in the recent past for 
socialisefence to defer to the "natural" sciences to achieve 
something of their repute, so here it may oe held necessary to 
establish the "respectability" or "acceptability" of the term 
"tool” or "probe1 or "apparatus" in the hands of the technologist 
methodologician when he participates in philosophical argument.
If philosophy is# as Thakur reminds us, rrmijorly concerned with 
morals, eplstemoiogies and aesthetics, v.e arc d riven to seek for 
some imprimatur of such values in the tools, probes or apparatus 
of the technologist method ©logician, in order to see in them 
suitable instruments for use in a metlaodologyband a model which 
seeks the approval of philosophy*
Appeals to the aesthetic are commonly considered as too 
simplistic on the basis that argumentation is quelled too early 
by its advocacy. However we suggest that the aesthetic plays 
more than a minimal part in the technological and an assurance 
that its importance is observed may provide one contribution to
the threefold Thakurian requirement*
If between two systems choice has to be made, the 
mathematician# the s dentist and the philosopher hove often 
opted for the more elegant and simpler on those grounds alone* 
witness Einstein and Occam, he can draw from the pages of the 
past almost at random, examjiiee of the elegancies of the tools 
and apparatus devised and used and of such nimnlicities of basic 
design characterising them which made them fruitful sources of 
further inventive design and ays tema t is a t io n -
biggurats ana pyramids combine elegant and simple basic 
design with the ina theme tied insights and 
metaphysical spurs which inspired them, 
da vinci*s notebooks contain many folios of mechanical 
sketches from his many scientific studies, all of 
which a re Impeccably beautiful and some possibly 
sublime in the Kantian sense*
;v Tinting eye terns and book production arc-: inspired
by aesthetically pleasing standards especially
in terns of visual presentation which seems almost 
at times to precede their communicative functions* 
Common household apparatus such as the spinning wheel 
arc prised as much for their visual satisfaction 
as for their functional values unci Morris 
developed this theme as much for philosophy as 
for reasons of practical application*
Poetic and scientific cl evelopmcntal relationships
are shown between'say* oirds of the air and planes
dolphins and submarines; horses and cars*
If our appeal for the repute of apparatus, probes and tools 
be insufficiently advanced by reference to such aesthetic facets, 
we might reinforce our argument by consideration of those 
philosophers who come to their "trade" via tools - few and limited 
as these have sometimes been* The lens was instrumental in the
development of philosophic systems based: on vision as with
Berkley (X), mpinosa (2} end mnlebranche (i, who saw "all things 
in uod.% through arguments# if not entirely based on the lens
the microscope and the telescope, yet were closely accompanied 
by these intermediaries* The telescope was os inseparable from
the philosophers of the benaissnnea and the bopernican revolution 
as for their successors of the p^^ent day. Mreraft with its
hind reel apparatus arc inseparable adjuncts of the Binateinian 
epoch and its aftermath with its total reassessment of universale. 
Mathematics lias always been an accepted "tool" of the philosopher 
whether through number, letter, graph, contour or* map: Platonic
and Cambridge schools elevated mathematics to the mein instrument 
of thought, the former in metaphysical and the latter in logical
manner*
Deprived of tools we are incompetent and primitive* Man 
is homo faber (h) as well as and possibly before homo sapiens, 
as Borgson saw him transforming both himself morally and the 
material things which surrounded him by his fabrications* without 
my eyeglasses I could not transfer these considerations to type 
and evaluation; the cripple without his wheelchair would be "half" 
man* the polio victim without his artificial luoy would be m  tmn 
at all. lolanyi emphasises this in his insistence on the "tools" 
or "probes" as he prefers to call them which extend our bodily 
equipment and make us more effective and more intelligent beings ($) 
scientists whether social or no and philosophers too* cannot
function to full potential without tools and the techniques and 
technological methoaologies which support them and this even if we 
reduce "tools" to one - The Word - which became the basis for an 
entire philosophical system for many years and is still an 
important ingredient of all* By our later exploration of such a 
critical tool m  the word ana the concepts based thereon# we shall 
hope to establish, the cpistemoXogic&X rectitude of our presentation 
of the technological methodology and its model* For the ethical 
acceptance of the caps 8 m  ofi^hent8ulhlb£b|l:Ml model/to picture 
the road to a continuing improvement of social-science in its 
contribution to order and to' truth* ” '
If by such argumentation ne are a ble to establish that
our Technological Methodology characterised by its Technological
Model with its ingredient tools, probes and apparatus, is
acceptable cog decent ground for scientific, socially scientific
and phiXosopMca 1 investigation and.' that’ the tools, probes and
apparatus ere not mere adjunct thereto, we may have cleared the
way for further reinvcotigatlone and reassessments which might
lead to further refinements of approach and. possibly to new 
developments of now elements in the w hoXb* I
By our presentation we hope that we have given to the word 
"tool” a new aura of acceptability which might not proceed If it 
were merely considered as an element of a tool-shed* "Tool" is a 
useful brief word if its connotation is not slurred: it can be 
synonymed with probe (pace i-olanyi) f instrument or artefact or
apparatus if these are felt to be more acceptable* Xhcle (6) 
considers the instrument as the mediator between individual and 
individual or between individual and his world in n manner of 
magnification, amplification# reduction# clarification, selectivity 
of the phenomena open to the oenses. we have tended in the past to 
accept the tool or probe as extending the functioning of the body bu 
such Yi: riiers as ;.,ournier (7) suggest that technological methodology 
with its probes is moving av;ay from extending our body to extending 
our mind and our language* Uieoeur*s tools (8) are so far 
extended as to lead to the conclusion that "knowledge is also a 
tool or instrument*n
some philosophers according to Bunge (9) consider 
scientific theory as nothine but tools* bunge does not go so far as 
this ana I concur, feeling that such exaggeration of position in 
merely substitution or elbion of c m  word for another*
Mournier holds that
"The machine as implement is not a simple material 
extension of our members. It is another order# an annex
to our language# an auxiliary language to mathematics#
a means of penetrating# dissecting and revealing the
secret of things# their implicit intentions, their
unemployed c opacities*"
"hue*s thesis (10) is one of the transform:;tion of 
experience by the mediation of the artefact, be does not deny 
end even" emphasises the non-neutral character of instrumental 
knowledge which may transform beneficially the direct perceptual 
field. This follows wolcnyi's argument of the extension of 
capacities by the use and. existence of proses.
It Is no argument of thin thesis that tools# probes or 
apparatus arc the exclusive perquisites of soeial-seience. what 
we do aimue is that our concept of the tool# probe or apparatus 
.under the aegis of the technological methoaoloyy in of particular
significance and possibly of prime significance for social-science 
enabling the projection of individual choice,through the 
systemotisation of levels as demonstrated in the model, to 
refinements made aaimreiit and. made possible by the Intermediary 
of the fools, probes or apparatus as indicated at each level* ■ 
end xit 1\ the special assistance of the feedbacks made possible by 
cybernetic systemstisation* ,.,airm of the tools, probes or apparatus 
will be specific to socinl-scicncc: tea ..orbs, the concepts, 
the systems developed by the eym. motician In concert with the 
eocial-scieniiet, the magistral oversight of sjciai-seience 
.,ith its corpus of consensual expertise ill be the moat
important of these* mime tools, .probes and apparatus mill be 
shared oitn me.themetlclans, logicians and pi: ilos opliera• ell 
together .,111 brine a nom rigour 1.... els... to 
a) non-triviulity
bj the opening of social-sciencc to a new stratum
of possibilities, leading continuously to 
new tests, and ncw hypotheses 
cj the replacement of such olunt tools as interviews, 
questionnaires and sample polling vsith greater 
refinements.
5. . I *./ i. W ’.v’- U
Tlie vocabulary of social~sc ienee is not ■ specific to it.
,^ -cl (11) emphasises this . lion he says "ail knowledge of 
social science In contradistinction to knowledge of natural science 
is in a twofold any mediated ay language." However we see that 
disadvantage levelled against ail the sciences anci specific 
£ t£ i &oiplirea, even laathematics when it has to speak in woMs a m
verbal concepts as well as in signs, numbers and letters, more 
Particularly however and more frequently in socia 1-science 
certain vocabularies and concepts which ploy tin important part 
in its elucidation end development hare been taken over with 
insufficient exploration and elaboration. A word or a phrase has 
often been adopted by soci&l-seienee on the basis of pre­
suppositions which have become scaffolds for flimsy theories# • 
bocinl-Gcientists might look carefully at the- school of linguistic 
philosophers for lessons in the analysis of basic verbal 
conceptualisation. Alienation, class, role end others which are
the Gtocm-ir-traac of sociology, often appear as given without 
further question and indeed as a stop to argument# For example, 
"democracy-1 is usually invoked as end, not beginning of discussion*
If the tools of social-scienoe begin with its words, we 
should like first tea foremost to explore what is to us the 
hey titular word M-JlM-sGIMUs. This hyphenated hybrid we are 
at pains to employ in an endeavour to resolve the confusions 
which surround the so-called social sciences through confused 
nomenclature, unexplained inclusions and exclusions In their 
content and ramifications and the careless substitution of one 
name for another#
Be quote Locke's dicta (12) concerning the abuse of words - 
"Unless a marfs words excite the same ideas in the 
hearer which he makes them stand for in speaking, he
does not speak in tslligiuly* "
"another great abuse of sores is inconsistency in the
use of them* If is hard to find a discourse ’written 
of any subject# especially of controversy, whereon one 
shall observe, if he reads with attention, the same 
words (ana those most c mmonly the most material in the 
discourse upon which the argument turns) used sometimes 
for one collection of simple ideas and sometimes for 
another, which is perfect abuse of language*"
"In all discourse wherein one man pretends to instruct 
or convince another, he should use the sane word 
constantly in the seme sense. If this were done (which 
nobody can refuse without great disingenuity) many of the 
books extant might be spared; several of those great 
volumes, swollen with ambiguous words, now used in 
one sense and by and by in another, woulc shrink into 
a very narrow compass.”
'v.inch, for one of the commentators on the social sciences, ii 
not guiltless of suel: confusions and muddles which hover around the 
words ana concepts of his overall title "social science"* .Mile 
we aumitiealy scorn for a degree of unity between philosophy, the 
sciences and technology which may lead to building of Th&kur-ian 
bridges and a breaming of the rote beyond together, yet we roust 
ever submit that unity to a division of labour* philosophers 
turned social scientist are as hard put to as social scientists 
turned philosophers, despite or possibly because of such 
consensus as rolanyi suggests* However most social-scientists
recognise, respect and understand the need for segregating out 
such areas of philosophical investigation as metaphysics,ethics, 
logic, aesthetics and ontology for specialist attention and even 
life work and are aware of what these various fields cover and. 
concern, without necessarily being expert in them* such cross 
disciplinary expertise is emphasised by buppes (13) "philosophy 
of science requires that its practitioners know as much, if not 
more, about the specific sciences they treat, as the practitioners 
themselves." It would be reassuring to feel that a reciprocal 
understanding is true of philosophers and philosophers of science 
engaging in discussion of the social sciences, winch for example 
seems to represent those who either do not fully understand or who
set aside the titular distinctions within the territory of social- 
science.
winch, among philosophers, is certainly not alone in this 
but probably even more blameworthy are participants in the very
field of ©ocial-acience who seem equally confused or confusing 
or who confuse their part with the larger whole. Emphasising such 
confusion we find that although the library system of Dewey 300 
is correctly classified "social science", in most libraries from 
the humble to the exalted, these shelves abound in volumes which, 
give witness to the gross confusion, in indexing, in inclusion and 
in reference, as to what is and, what is not social-science and 
whet are the bases of its subsidiary classifications and their 
relationships, bo the currency of soeial-ocience is debased from 
the outset of its study and pursuit.
It would be tedious to catalogue all such confusions of 
nomenclature exhibited in winch's book; a few may opffice - 
In spite of the title "The Idea of a social science",
"I propose, in this monograph, to attack such a 
conception of the relation between the social 
studies (sic), philosophy and the natural sciences.” 
"This conclusion has important consequences for our 
conceptions of the social studies (sic) particularly 
the theoretical part of general sociology and, the 
foundations of social psychology. As is well known, 
there has always been some dispute about the role 
which sociology ought to play vis-a-vis the other
social studies (sic), some have thought that 
sociology should be the social science (sic) par 
excellence, synthesising the results of special 
social studies (sic), others, however, have wanted 
to regard sociology simply as one social science (sic) 
on the same level as all the others, confined to 
a restricted subject matter of its own.!
UI have made no attempt in this book, to consider the 
undoubted differences which exist between particular 
kinds of social study (sic) such as sociology, 
political theory, economics and so on*??
“Collingivoo^s view is nearer the truth than is that 
most favoured in empiricist methodologies of the 
social sciences (sic)”• Yet Collingwood is basically
historian and antiquarian and Winch makes no attempt 
to justify the claim of history to be social science.
We wish to state clearly here that all our arguments 
rest on the tool-word
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not on such variants, with their disturbing confusions, as social 
science, social sciences, not even social relations (Winch p.121),
human inter relations in society (Winch p#hO) into which he slips 
in such slipshod, fashion without justifying and perhaps without 
even noticing his change in vocabulary, Thus he might seem to 
participate in the commonly held opinion that social-science is 
a hodge-podge of matters that cannot be clearly defined, that 
all is grist to its mill end could be subsumed under it without 
much hope of orderly procedure let alone scientific rigour*
It is perhaps the greatest danger in this discussion of 
the titular importance, that the word ?lsociologyM should be 
equates with social-science aa Winch seems to do on page 28 
among other instances, where he is quoting from one of the early
fathers of sociology - Durkheim* Were sociology content to be
participant among the social sciences with particular care for 
the vast study required by congregation, segregation,
desegregation and re-congregation, muddled misunderstandings 
such as Locke warns against, might have been less frequent in our 
field and the disrepute into which sociology and sociologists have 
frequently been drawn by seeming subjective bias and the use of 
unexplored verbosities, might not have redounded as they have on 
social-science as a whole, Sociology, we repeat, can be 
considered as subsidiary and parallel partner with the other 
departments of social-science, each of which might be considered as 
a contributory tool in the total' apparatus of the socialise lent 1st*
Hot only is there this confusion of titular nomenclature 
in &ineh but his approach self-adrnittedly to ”social science”, 
frequently fails to do justice to its named sub-divisions ~
a) dismissing anthropological matters in a manner with which 
we have considerable basic sympathy since we agree that 
cross-cultural comparisons are fraught with danger*
However anthropology hue established Itself as the name 
of a valid area of socialisefence and this name does not 
appear in his index nor does he attexspt to evaluate it as 
subject in its own right, whether or not to be used 
ultimately for the purpose* of eross-eiiliural comparison «
It is to he hoped that lie does not subscribe to the limited 
and outmoded, view that anthropology is concerned only with 
cultures such as those of Tobrianderers.
b#according short shrift to the word or concept of “economics” 
which has only one ms in entry in the text and index and that 
an apparent attempt to air an example of liquidity preference 
which is averred to be (p*89) “not generally used by 
business men in the conduct of their affairs but by the 
economist who wishes to explain the nature and consequences 
of certain kinds of business behaviour, little this seems 
to display of knowledge of the everyday uses of liquidity 
preferences and the usefulness of that concept and that term 
beyond the confines of all e cGnomics let alone that of 
professional economists# {l£f)«
c#omitting the term “political science” from, the index although 
his final paragraph^ shows some semblance of applying 
historioo-political-religious criteria# Ad mam smith is not 
mentioned nor his modern counterparts unless Winch 
includes Marx among such: his index contains five full 
references to Marxism*
a.including the term “statistics” with only two brief
references and one footnote with no development of modern 
techniques of data assembly, reduction, interpretation, 
storage, retrieval ana systems, ties lion, all bo critical
to the social-seientisi# There is no mention at all 
of the possibilities held out by cybernetic or systems 
analysis nor, on a more general level, of the indutetive 
processes#
so winch and other philosophical commentators of his genre
narrow the limits of interpretation of socialiseienee to sections 
only of its field by failure to rlgourise their approach to 
nomenclature, and to those sections which in the main have 
historico-politico-liferary linguistic bases# At the same time 
such humanist style commentators diffuse the application of the 
term eocial-science as they see it, so widely as to make its 
core Indiscernible* If we try to e- equate the word social-science 
with all knowledge about all humanity in its infinite diversity 
of “problems”, we shall constantly be met with a question such 
as that asked by bearle (15)
“why is it that the methods of science have not given 
the kinds of results in the study of human behaviour 
that they have been able to give us elsewhere# Or, to 
put it more pointedly, why has so much of the social 
sciences seemed to be a bore and unproductive# n 
Perhaps the older scientific methodologies now so much in a state 
of flux and readjustment, together with the confused approach of 
the humanists to the vocabularies, conceptual and other apparatus 
of social-seience have combined to produce this appearance of 
unproductive bore* Perhaps we social-scientiste are also a t fault 
in having tried in the past to do too much supericially without 
clarity of terminology and without having first worked out a 
philosophy of social-science and, as Keynes and Robbins suggested, 
a sound methodology of approach based on a clearer int erpretation 
of what eoeial-scienee really is, what its sub-divisions concern 
and what its vocabularies and concepts means#
(Rote: winch is certainly not alone in confusions of the
territories involved in social-science and their 
nomenclatures* A whole thesis of librarian work is 
called for to display the admitted confusions induced 
by some library classifications, book publishing department* 
and sales aepartmenta* We have adverted briefly to this 
in Addendum B)
Yet simplifications and economies deriving from care with 
vocabularies and classifications, by sub-divisions and divisions 
of labour within the social-scienceterritories, will not suffice 
for the improvement we seek, if the tool word sooial-science is 
too widely drawn* ■ It will be its function to specialise in a 
critical and methodological maimer neither yielding to constraints
dictated by outmoded approaches to “science”, not diluting its 
approach in a plethora of the minutiae of a humanistic problem 
oriented approach. It will neither deal with totalities and 
universale on which it will be guided by philosopher colleagues, 
nor with every aspect of the human condition as separateMp roblems;f 
It may possibly be due to some intellectual greed on the part of 
earlier social scientists that they, disenchanted with their 
intellectual origins outside the mainstreams of socia1-science 
and with the gauntlet of distrust that they have had frequently
to run, have attempted to invade too many other specific areas 
of thought, work and research without adequate expertise therein 
and thus have themselves nourished patent weaknesses in social-
science. This ia not a condition unique to social-scientists*
It is likely that a new acceptance of the simplifications,
economies and constriction of aims, achieved by the new 
technological methodology and posed by its apparatus, is necessary 
to gain that greater clarity, a closer approach to philosophical 
certainty and the positting of sensible and obtainable goals 
that we seek.
“Interdisciplinary” conceived as the breaking down of 
fences into a single area is not going to help and indeed may 
compound epistemological confusions, although It may lead to 
the drawing of new boundaries between specialisms, simplification, 
economy and restraint imposed by careful consideration of 
apparatus, including tool-words, may be the contribution offered 
by the new social-science to clearer delineations* bchumaoher(l6) 
took his world by storm with “small is beautiful”: we might offer 
here as parallel “simplicity, economy and restraint in social- 
science is fruitful” and such aphorism prove helpful in the 
ready acceptance and development of the technological methodology 
for social-science with its models, its apparatus and its probes*
bur stress on the importance of the word as tool, or probe 
and hence of the tool-word social-sclenee, does not cause us to 
neglect the Importance of such words in context, use and utterance. 
The manner of argumentation and of presentation is so important as 
to point to a complete study of rhetorical argumentation which is 
the matter of reference in Addendum 2?.
The tool-word eoclcl-science is as we have presented it, 
scientific without isolation of the tern from technology especially 
in methodological aspect* Its totality is reflected in the model 
where it can be seen as a summation developed from a series of 
refinements of individual choice, based on individual needs both 
material and non-material, subjected to constant feedback from which 
adjustment• may be seen to be necessary for the fulfilment of those 
needs. It is then a science of regulatory and steering essence 
in which the crucial factors are the tools, probes or apparatus 
as set out at v erious levels of the model#
Tool-words are rarely to be considered in isolation 
but in the framework of the concepts they engender, (we do not
here propose to develop this theme as far as the argumentation 
which we have had to relegate to the Addendum previously indicated
We have considered in some detail the word as tool or probe in the 
social sciences and have discussed the delineation and use of the 
tool-words 11 secial-seience” and “individual” together with those 
which entitle the sub-divisions of social-scieaee. We have given 
thought to the tools or probes of figures and of data in their 
relation to words of individual sensation by our consideration 
of the quallty/Quantity syndrome*
We wish to discuss the importance of conceptual tools 
particularly in relation to levelthree of the technological 
model for socia 1-science* be draw several examples from the
soelal-science territory of Economics with which we are most 
familiar among the social-aciences* However we suggest that some 
of these conceptual tools derived from economics as special study 
as a mature contributor to social-sclence whose concepts have 
received much analytical attention, might usefully be conceived 
as possessing wider philosophical and scientific uses*
Economics has had to battle with laiscinceptions as to its 
rightful domain and therefore of its conceptual field* Ilayek (17) 
finds It no exaggeration to say that economics developed mainly 
as the outcome of the investigation and refutation of 
successive Utopian proposals, for the ixnpnveznent of undesirable 
effects of existing systems, based, on a complete disregard, of the 
forces which actually enabled those systems to work. Its
ability to deal with specific systems ana sub-systems stemmed 
from a theoretical system of conceptualisation which, in principl 
purparts to cover the relationship between all the relevant 
phenomena in its field of study* For example (18)
“an economist who made a recommendation to the British 
government about a change of money supply would not be 
surprised to be a eked to show how this might affect the 
level of employment in the building industry in the north
of Scotland* He might not be stole to show how this 
could toe completely answered offhand tout he would toe able
to show how the connection between the two phenomena 
would work* A sociologist advising on a proposed change 
in the s trueture of some institution, say the primary 
school% would not expect to toe able to show how the 
connection between the two phenomena would work in 
affecting the operation of authority in other institution 
e*g# the factories or the law courts, ho doubt some 
intelligent guesswork could toe made, tout the sociologist 
would not toe able to call to aid a well-established 
framework (based on accepted concepts) that would show 
how the casusal nexus between these disparate phenomena 
was likely to work* That is not to claim that if a 
number of economists were asked the first question they 
would produce the same answer $ they might well give 
different weights to various fratores in the final
equation* But there would, toe a wide measure of agreement 
on the main structural features of the system as a whole*
bo the methodologies anti conceptual b chemes of economics might 'be 
of use In wider fields than their own,
We might hope that von £isesf(19) assertion that "no 
line of any contemporary philosophy discloses the least familiarity
«vith even the most elementary problem of economics1* in no 
longer true, although we recall with regret winch*s short 
shrift to its concepts* perhaps the philosopher concerned to 
give economics is due might subscribe to Weberns interpretation 
if it as a 11 technique’1 and it would certainly suit our present 
thesis to consider economics a a a considerable tool of the 
social-scientific totality*
Ihe concept of aHOHl idJH as contrasted with long run is of 
major importance in economics and could well be considered as a 
useful concept across the board of the social sciences* It is 
doubtful however whether the philosopher could admit it into 
his armory except as foil to his ultimate sights.
It is not the fact that economics is * future oriented1 
giving and making predications that gives it its peculiar 
character* Making predictions, shore particularly short term 
predictions is indeed one of its contributions and although 
some of these predictions have been very imperfect their quality 
and usefulness steadily increases and,- under the aegis of
the technological methodology will increase more rapidly and 
to more effect, let even if economies were less successful in 
forecasting* its place is crucial through its ability to express 
in verifiable units of measurement both qualitatively as well as 
quantitatively * the situation as of now (20). Iliis means
a) that it can* by using its large accumulations of 
measured data from the' immediate pact» plot underlying 
trends and tendencies
and
b) that it can establish fairly precise conditions for the 
validation or rejection of hypotheses about the further
development of those trends.
The longer the run* the greater the flimsinese of the hypothesis: 
the shorter the run the greater the possibility of accuracy. To 
narrow the sights of the social-sclentist to the short run and 
his analysis of the present may make greater sense of his work 
and lead him to recognise the kind of factors which militate
against longer run teleologies and the vital importance of the 
feedback factors of the methodology which may lead to adjustments 
of his framework#for longer.runs#
Modern welfare economics has taught us that the goal of 
optimisation cannot be deduced within the framework of a limited 
view of economics# Yet this does not mean that it may be chosen 
arbitrarily, partial goals and criteria for their achievement 
will be vindicated by m m  ultimate long-run goals and criteria 
which will only be partially within the influence of economics (21) 
or social-science and for which the soeial-seientist will have to 
try to become or turn to the? philosopher and visualise those 
philosophic contentions as feeding in to the system through I-p.
tClie concept of GBTkEis PARlBUo cannot be claimed to be the 
exclusive perquisite of the economist but it has been largely
used by M m  as a simplifying device# It will be seen in our later 
discussion of the aystematination of cybernetics that it is akin 
to the Black box concept. It enables a basic simplicity of 
approach which is paralleled by Crusoe economics and* concentrating 
on fundamentals to the exclusion for the time b eing only, of 
peripherals which con be introduced in later stages. This method 
of concentration and subsequent adjustment by successive 
approximations to real situations seems a venture into trial 
and error methods approved by the basic popperian hypothesis.
The choice of what Is considered as fundamental in the ceteris 
paribus approach, is of course critical: we hope to have
justified our choice in our discussion of the Individual with 
his preferences. Alertness to possible errors of emphasis in 
initial assumptions of the "fundamental11 must be even greater 
than the necessary skills in recognising whan where and how 
to apply the variants.
The artificiality with which the ceteris paribus exercise 
is criticised, is akin to that applied to the model or the “gerae** 
which make no claim to reality but to a capacity to elucidate 
that reality more clearly than by mere static metaphor*
T m  ceteris paribus exercise or concept can also be used 
to reduce the constraints of the time factor* Other things 
being seen to remain equal or as they are or as they were,
results in the isolating of one factor which may change from the 
c o m p a n y  of other factors which remain static* Thus an alliance 
of the ceteribus paribus conceptual tool with the short-run tool 
may produce very limited but very secure footholds for 
elaboration.
The concept of hAHCIXhAblTf is an analytic tool largely 
developed by the classical school of British economists and by- 
Marshall in particular {22}. The interest of this concept for 
more general use lies in its insistence on the margins of choice 
(demand) and offering (production) which eliminates the need to 
deal in unvrieldly totalities end the opportunity for 
concentrating on the critical areas of potential change*
Bureaucracies under the aegis of regulation, rule, decree
or lav; are well adapted for dealing with recognised regularities: 
it is the marginal which often eludes but which is so vital in
the detection of tendency to short run change and which, as we have 
seen, is an important territory of economic, of social-scientific, 
and possibly even of some aspects of philosophy in their 
discussion of causal relationships and time dimensions*
The little more or the little less: the last straw that 
breaks the camel*s back or which stimulates into change or 
invention* such are the areas of what is more specifically and 
detestably ^marginal” to the economist# For it Is not how much 
the individual wishes in his choice or tolerance but what elements 
of more or lees will lead to discontinuities, cessations or 
changes of direction# All this still not applied to materials 
alone, which admittedly have been the main concern of most 
marginal theorists in the past but is a conceptual tool of great
potential value in dealing with all manner of tolerances and 
breaking and developing points#
we may be able to discern that the marginal concept will be 
very useful in visualising the boundaries of in relation to 
s**r since the more or less of individual choice will be paramount
in determining what will be ceded through rectifications by way
Of b—P*
The conceptual tool of ELASTICITY encapsulates a degree of 
responsiveness or unrosponsiveness to change and so can be seen 
as close partner to the concept of marginal!ty examined above# 
Change tolerance before (marginal? breaking point, is as relevant 
to the human • situation ) as to materials in the manner
of metal fatigue*
Admittedly the factors of elasticity will be related to 
or calculated from past symptoms but if v.e accept the underlying 
assumption of nosial-science and of economics £xt> pariicipant in
social-ncience, that it deals in trends ana tendencies evaluated 
from the moat recently developed data, then we shall not be 
faced with the hopelessness of being able to do nor to prescribe 
nothing in the face of complexities proceeding from the need 
to assess response to change* If there can be any projections, if 
there can be any assumptions based on probabilities, then, the 
calculated, assessments of current responsiveness or uuresponsivene* 
to change (elasticities) are well ahead in the field of economics 
and may suitably have wider.implications for use in social-science 
and possibly philosophy*
The last concept drawn from economics that we wish to 
develop in the sense of transferability of tool concepts to other 
branches of sooial-science and possibly also to philosophy is 
that of jlobllXBEXOJii. (Addendum 1) lists some of the ether 
concepts from Economic science which might be suitable for further 
investigation in this sense)«
The idea of balance has always exerted a profound 
influence on reasoning which itself might be termed a balanced or
equilibrated judgment^* It'lies at the root of Aristotle*s via 
media between the extremes and as such is a possible ameliorator 
for dichotomies of excess* it is the unseen operant in Adam 
smith1 e i#hand” working towards a desired optimum* it is 
fundamental to the systematisation of equilibrium analysis 
developed by Vialras (25) and his successors in input/output 
analysis: it is also fundamental, as we shall see more clearly
later, to the concept of Homeostatia used by cyberneticians (2k)
as a mutual inter-corre-etive of systems to reduce the effects of 
outside disturbances* The' concept of equilibrium thus used.
and paralleled with homeostatis originated primarily from chemical 
reactions,and was used in understanding biological problems 'such as 
the maintenance of body temperature in iiamimls or the equilibrium 
of blood sugars and acidity in the circulatory system. From such 
wider uses than whose of mere supply and demand analyses of 
elementary economics, the concept of equilibrium can be seen as 
the guardian of what can be in truth maintained and thus as a 
conceptual apparatus capable of extending short-run Etenyl analyses#
We might see Equilibrium in philosophic sense as having 
close connection with the concept of consensus and possibly with 
Ayer’s (25) attempted reconciliation between two philosophic 
systems - that of common sense and that of scientific realism,
each reacting on the other in something akin tbosmotic interchange
for a final balance of outcome. Taleott parsons too uses the 
concept of equilibrium in sociological setting. (25a)
In making this selective approach to key concepts from 
economics which we consider aa tools, probes or apparatus 
appropriated to the third, level of our model, .*e do not ignore • 
and have transferred to Addendum I) reference to other concepts which 
could, equally well be explored and offered for extended use 
across the board of soeial-science* vve have chosen-the concepts of 
Economics becu&ee this is the area of* social-ecience of which we 
have closer specialist knowledge. lie would leave to fellow 
specialists the work of presenting concepts from other fields of 
Boc ia!-sc ience•
because Economics has been a specialist study for so long 
and because it has therefore developed its apparatus to a high
if not perfect degree of accuracy e*g* in the Cambridge school 
models, there are those economists, notably jjsyek (26) who 
having extended their thinking in terms of the concepts of 
economics to social science in greater generality, are in their 
maturity (some might unkindly say their senescence) reverting 
to their original specialisation i*e* economics, as the nuo 
of not the totality of soeial-science# Ihis most certainly 
not from a f.arxist viewpoint vrith economic forces as the 
historical and. inevitable ruler of man*s destiny, but from a 
contention that the science of economics has sho^n most verve, 
mast accuracy, most sincerity and most clarity of conceptualisation 
in its concern for man#
If one re-reads such fathers of economics as Adam Smith 
and the rhysiocratic writers, one is struck by their attention 
to the moral sciences and by their otherness from the modern
common conception of the economist who has become confused with 
a commercial specialist* Is Economics as Ifayeic avers the
leader in social-ecience? Gan it extend its scope without 
becoming too general or degenerating into a mere instrument of 
politicians? Gan it reasonably subsume the other fields of 
aoci&l-scienee? As Economist by initial training, X would reply 
*%olw Are the tools of the economica kit - in terms of word 
and concept - applicable and useful in other areas of aooial-scieno 
and possibly beyondV X suggest that the answer to that is trYes*M
Having considered the word and the Concept as elements
in our model, ?*e reserve for separate and detailed consideration
the apparatus par excellence in our exercise i*e. the
aystemati sat ion, computerisation and. cybernetic processing of .
social-science* Moreover this will need some prior consideration
of their basic materials - the data under aegis of inductive
approach*
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iVe do not deny the use in our model of a hypothetico- 
deductive approach but as our argument from Individualism 
presupposes that the use and development of the model is 
based on a summation and refiifeeat of individual choice or 
preference, .»© feel that it may be considered necessary to give 
some t '-ought to the use of inductive approaches in socialise fence 
as we.consider it*
to this end we should like to invoke Aristotle rather 
than attend to the so-called dilemma of Induction stemming from 
Hume's methods* In the Prior Analytics (1) Aristotle speaks of 
induction as a kind of syllogism in which we reach a universal
conclusion from an exhaustive survey of the cases it covers 
{modern summative induction)* {For the social-scientist the 
conclusion reached will not be termed “universal“ but partial 
in concert with the trend and tendency manner of his general 
approach to his science.) In the posterior Analytics (2) 
Aristotle speaks of the establishment of an instance or instances 
which reveal to thought the necessity of the connection asserted 
(modern intuitive induction). But there is a thirdt vis; 
ampllative induction through a sufficiency of cases to convince 
and act upon and from our argument it will be seen that we 
hold”6Ufflciencyu to be equated to increasingly “totality” both in 
qualitative and in quantitative terms, such then will be our
ground supported e.g. by otrawson (3)
“suppose someone were asked what he meant by saying he- 
had good grounds for holding a belief expressible in the 
form “Every case of f is a case of g, I think it would be 
felt to be a satisfactory answer if he replied, 4Well*
in all my wide and varied experience I’ve 
come across innumerable cases of P and never a case of
£ which wasni a case of g*. In saying this be is
clearly claiming to have inductive support f inductive 
evidence of a certain kind, for his belief; and he is 
also giving a perfectly proper answer to the question, 
what he meant by saying that he had ample {my italics) 
justification, good grounds, good reasons for his 
belief*”
otravvson’s justification can be further reinforced for the social**
scientist within the working of the Technological Mode1 by the
ability of its processes to cope with ever ampler responses and 
a nearer to total evidence.
It might well be that the Mreasonableness of the belief 
of Strawson’s '‘someone*1 might be challenged in spite of the 
technological enlargement of his “wide and varied experience%  
However as Keynes argued (h) there are probabilities dependent 
on knowledge and ignorance that are relative and it can be 
supposed that there is also a more objective probability which 
is not chance dependent or less completely so, against which 
the borne one’s reasonableness can be calculated. This is where 
our model demonstrates its trength through totalities of data 
on which to base belief.
The relationship of probability towards .-hleh many of 
the calculations of social-sclexica have been traditionally 
oriented, is inevitably complex. However the complexities of 
projection are absorbed pari passu with the accumulation and 
handling of totalities of data and not exacerbated by the 
problems which inhered from a basis of limited samplings.
bo, possibly, Hayek’s reservation (5) that "the number of separate 
variables which in any particular .social phenomenon will determine 
the result of any given change will as a rule be far too large 
for any human mind to master and manipulate tnem effectively,1 
may be seen to be outdated and by-passed by n m  apparatus 
which extend the capacities of the human mind. Nevertheless 
for those who wish to promote probability patterns they may have 
to rely on frequency probability theories with ranges or calculi 
of probabilities such as those suggested by Wittgenstein and 
developed by V/sismann and Heichenbach. Bven here it would seem 
certain that any such use of probability theories in the affairs 
of SQcial-science will be able to assume more testable 
regularities of outcome than those which were mathematically 
appropriate to the eabulation of red and black balls from an urn 
or the number of head and tail flips from tossed coins.
lime and periodic factors and the total circumstances 
of change will pose problems for our justification of any 
probability hypotheses based on the inductive processes at work 
in the collection one projective development in the collection 
of ample or near complete data. Ought we then to disengage 
from thinking about and planning for the future? should we 
accept with equanimity the rather artless conclusion of 
Blackburn;(6) “in any case, it is enough at present that we 
can justifiably be content that in some respects, and for some
time, the future will indeed be like the past. M probably one 
of the main tasks in the systematisetion of our envisaged 
technological methodology as applied to social-science will 
be to enlarge and assure “the respects91 and the “some time” 
of Blackburn1 s dictum. The conceptual tool from economics of 
“short run11 and the cybernetic systematisation of{ffee&back"may
in such enlargement and assurance, more especially if, as 
Black argues (?) probability must steadily approach unity 
to justify induction. We claim that our totalities of data, 
both qualitative and quantitative, will make possible this approach 
to unity, whether present or future probabilities are the matter 
'for representation.
b&Imon’s approach to the justification of the use of 
inductive processes takes the following form -
“It is often noted that we deal in practice with finite 
sequences only* Various attempts have been made to assure^ 
the application of inductive knowledge to finite classes 
of observed events, one approach is to finitise the 
frequency interpretation of probability so that probability 
is identified with the actual r elative frequency in a 
finite sequence. Another approach is to attempt to justify 
a rule for inferring directly from one finite sample to 
another overlapping finite sample, hone of the approaches 
of application of inductive knowledge to finite numbers 
of unobserved cases has been worked out with complete 
success but 1 know no reason to regard any of them as 
hopeless.H
r,we cannot prove beforehand that we will be successful in
inferring limits of relative frequencies by using inductive 
processes for enumeration,for the relative frequencies
of the attributes v*e deal .ith may not have limits.
However vie can be assured that if such limits do exist 
persistent use of induction by enumeration will establish
them to a desired degree of accuracy. M
Examining these dic^ta we again stress that the technological 
methodology and model with its tools* probes and apparatus, may aid
the mathematician and logician in their search for greater 
accuracies proceeding from inductive 'methods by the example of 
our social-seienee methodology.
To utilise inductive processes as' does the social-scientist 
is not to deny to him a deductive programme with its hypotheses 
for his overriding framework* Our conceptual malady of 
dichotomising has once more gone into action to sunder deductive 
and inductive processes as opposed or mutually exclusive. They 
may be Been as pulling at or leading to the fulcrum of knowing in 
double harness. All the same one of the major fears of the 
sooial-scientiet may be that his data and apparatus for handling 
itmay prove so vast that it could fall prey to ill-ventiliated 
pre-suppositions reflected in faulty programming, guided by 
ill-founded and ill-tested deductive approaches amounting to
dogmas and used, at worst, for power purposes by social or - 
political worker in the guise of aocial-scientist# our twofold
drives to eliminate such dangers and such fears rest on
a) the extension of the amplitude of the data both 
quantitative and eiualiiative
b) constraints on the areas of social involvement by- 
emphasis on the individual person as X-i~*
Our uses of induction are not invoked in terms of 
causality end probability projeetions: they are invoked as
evidence of what Is, deduced from what recently was and with 
constant reassessment of the present tense evidence through the 
rectifications of feedback, wince our model shows the possibility 
of the constant adjustment of the what is, if not at every moment, 
then at frequent intervals accompanying the amplification of data, 
then the problems of causality that so many theorists of induction
stress, may be seen to be reduced if not eliminated altogether.
/ . . ,4 
harre seems disposed to agree {6j. Juxtapositions of data in
systems adapted to cybernetic processes will result in either
acceptable compalabilities or rejected incompatibilities thus
resolving much of the “problem of induction” which we paranthetichBj
note, both *;ittgenstein and Strawson label a 'pseudo problem.
It will be necessary even in our constrained field and 
with all the techniques at our command to make selections from 
all available data. We must be alert to the need to make 
consensual judgments by eystematisers and social ^-scientists, 
having in mind Polanyi1© reservations on humsn capacities and 
hoping that'the very consensus will refine those judgments, 
hone of our approaches will be pehbet. Bearing Popper in mind 
one might almost hope for the imperfections, defects and 
incompatabilitie© which will be thrown out by the mechanics of 
our technique and by the niceties of our apparatus, thus leading 
to tighter and more v slid regimes. Our emphases on amplification 
of data with consensual selection; on strict temporal restraint
on any projections felt necessary; on total field restraint on
social'-science as a whole: all will lead ua to hope for ever
increasing validity.to be derived from the data.
We take as exemplar of outmoded methods of data collection 
end use which demonstrates the defects and <3angers inherent 
in such method and upon which the technological methodology
augurs well to improve, especially in the field of socialiseience,
Durlcheirn’s work on suicide
The “disease” of suicide which Burkheim took such pains 
to explore with the limited apparatus available to him, we 
can conceive as the marginal state of the individual when he 
opts out from our is forced to opt out from the totality of his 
person both X-l and b-f. The breaking point m  opine will derive 
from the former and not from the latter alone or mainly therefrom, 
pace Burkheim*
what we are drawn to admire in Burkheim’s v?ork is the model 
he presents of method ^ collecting and collating available data 
in the limited earlier circumstances in which he worked and even 
if one withdraws assent from his conclusions. Durkheim seems to 
have relied unwittingly on his own pre-conceptions and possessed 
no neutral apparatus-to put to work on his laboriously collected 
material. It is possible that today we have such apparatus or are 
in sight of having such but that we may be satisfied with less 
rigorous collation and sifting of the data before the 
application of our methodological technology and its model. This
is a danger of which we must be aware in the euphoria generated 
by our new apparatus*
l)urkheim*s reliance on cross national statistics of suicide
(9) can hardly be thought suspect in the binchian sense, since
France
Frussia
Bngland
saxony
Bacarla
Denmark
which are the countries of his initial Table 1 are so little 
cross-cultura; that they may with good reason be subsumed under
one investigation in a way that would be inappropriate to the 
inclusion of, say, the Tobrianderers*
There ensue
a) comparison with general mortality (Table XX)
with delrees of difference between consecutive years, 
b} comparison internationally by sex#
e) comparison inter-departmentally (France ) by religion, 
a) comparison internationally through figures of insanity,
e) comparison inter-departmentally (France) through alcoholism 
and internationally through alcoholism and internally
(Germany) through alcoholism (pp 49/81) 
t) comparison of Austrian provinces with respect to suicide and 
race,
g) comparison by stature (possibly anthropological type) 
li) comparison internationally at different ages,
1) comparison toy latitude (M.B# ItoFBUBkois pace Mootes&uieu
of climate)
j) comparison by season internationally, 
k) comparison of three countries toy months,
1} comparison toy length of day, 
m) comparison toy time of day, 
n) comparison toy day of week,
o; comparison toy seasonal variation in cities compared with 
the whole country, 
p) classification toy motive (a suspect note Is introduced here 
to which Burkheim refers thus: mvhat are called 
statistics of the motives of suicide are actually 
statistics of the opinions concerning such motives of 
officials, often lower officials, in charge of this 
information service” p.148. Was Burkheim himself 
admittedly not a “lower” official, guiltless of this?)
ci) comparison toy Italian provinces with reference to 
suicide and education (i.e. literacy), 
r) comparison toy religion - catholics, protestants and jews 
in Prussia 1883/6, 
s) comparison toy German- state© through sex and marital status, 
t) comparison for .each category of marital status in France 
By age groups and sex and province and sise 
of family,
u) comparison toy country and “great political upheaval” 
(revolution) p 203 
toy French “election crises11 p 204, 
toy national wars p 205.
However from this plethora of data culled with such care 
and affording a model for the social-scientist of today,
Burkheim seems to come to subjectively determined conclusions 
on for example p 208
“We have thus successively set up the three following 
propositions:
touicide varies inversely with the degree of integration 
of religious activity, 
suicide varies inversely with the degree of integration 
of domestic activity, 
touicide varies inversely with the degree of integration 
of political activity.”
There seems little justification for this wide sweep of 
conclusions from the data advanced and no consideration is given 
to the overriding concept of “degree of integration.w There 
appear to have been deep rooted pre-conceptions which are 
seemingly supported toy the vast'mass of data. Gould such data,
or their like be better served by such systematic analyses 
as we have -available to us with the substitution of computerised 
calaculation, and rectification for the eight-sweep of an already 
consult ted mind? Gan the processes of feedback illuminate and 
eliminate any pre-conceptions in the minds of the systems 
developers? It may well be so.
Burkheim continues through 
v) comparison of military and civilian suicide
internationally as example of “altruistic suicide”9 
w) comparison by trade cycle (not Burkheim' s phrase but a 
rough paraphrase of his seeming intention ), 
x) comparison internationally from the point of view 
of divorce and suicide, 
y) classification of the different manners of suicide, 
z) comparison with homicide statistics*
Burkheim1 s Appenxilt institutes the admirable method of 
mapping geographically the relationship of suicide to a range 
of the factors considered statistically above* It may well be that 
other similar semi-mathematical tools will prove invaluable 
in expanding the limitations'of statistics based on pure 
numerical considerations and make nearer our approach to 
qualitative rather than purely quantitative assessments#
Go Burkheim may be seen to offer a classic method of 
diligence in the pursuit of statistical data but his uses and 
comments thereon are apparently quite separate from the data 
because he advance©no prior methodological systematise*tion other 
than his unadmitted pre-conceptions* Moreover he had in his day 
no adequate apparatus to digest the data and attempt systernatisation 
therefrom.
This is the clanger of which the modern aoeial-seieotlst 
must be aware. He will have in some way to oscillate between 
the deductions from hie base to the refining and revising 
necessities that arise from ails inductions* burkheim seems hardly 
to offer a model of such oscillation although his final sentences 
do seem to give some grace to this.
hook tor example at his assessment of “collective life11 
based on undeniable -well assembled “cosmic” factors relating to 
suicide such as time of day (p 117) which lead, notwithstanding, 
to his seemingly aribtrary conclusions (p 119)
“The mere lengthening of the. says seems to offer 
wider latitude to collective life*** Thus its 
accompanying effects must develop simultaneously and, 
since suicide, Is one of them it must increase*” 
or again,
considering egehtio «aicxae after perfectly correctly assembling 
all the available statistics of confessional differences in 
relation to numbers of suicides (p 154) he comes to the 
conclusion (p 190;
“Because the Protestant church has less consistency 
than the others, it has less moderating effect upon suicide* ff
Ouch gulfs between accurate statistics and the seemingly 
disparate or foregone conclusions he draws, is also in evidence 
in his peroration (p 369 et.saq.)
“Thus what the•rising tide of deaths denotes is not the 
increasing brilliance of-our civilisation but a state of 
crisis and pe&urbatlon not to be prolonged with impunity*”
and
“Egoistic suicide results from the fact that society is not
sufficiently Integrated at all points to keep all its members
under its control*sl
After reGomsmnding a corporate approach to the malaisesf as 
he sees %hem9 of society which lead in his opinion to the 
increasing rates of suicide he observes, he does indeed have the 
final grace to say {pp 391/2)
Social reality is m %  mat enough and is so little 
understood as yet to be anticipated in detail.*** 
the important tning is not to draw up in advance a 
plan anticipating everything but rather to set reasonably 
to work*tl
Admittedly burkheim did “set to work** ana worked well but he 
overlooked that an anticipatory plan or system might obviate the 
scientist1s or'researcher1& personal pre-conceptions dominating 
his data* The important thing that such a detailed examination of 
a famous piece of work leads us to emphasise ia that social- 
scientists and philosophers in partnership}, should examine and 
attempt to neutralise such pre-conceptions which precede the plan 
or systeisatisation of the plan and which pre-cpnaition the 
direction of the work and its outcomes.
we. present the technological methodoiogya.^ith its model 
both as applied to social-science, with its modern apparatus 
ana methods of systematic analysis, followed by processes of 
hitherto undreamed of complexity and accuracy with inbuilt 
capacities to throw out incompatible assumptions and aon-logical 
procedures, an capable of overriding such weaknesses as those 
which our examination of burkheim* s norm seems to reveal*
Above all we stress that data gathered from the source of the 
Individual directly and not from categories or classes will lead to
Following as we do a critical methodological path, we 
subscribe to the Kantian observation that examples are necessary 
only from a “papular point of view (10)* that his present work (CPI 
was “not intended for popular use” and that those “devoted to 
science do not require such helps” “for explanations and - 
examples aid us in the comprehension of PAKls but they distract 
the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and. 
stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the WKGLK”.
Modern Philosophy is alert to the question of its 
normative aspects i.e. whether it should remain and. be seen to 
remain completely neutral and analytical or whether it should 
enter upon active involvement with the pragmatisms of everyday 
life* The Platonic involvement of Philosophers as Kings long 
h e M  sway to be balanced more recently by analytical inroads but 
“Unless, said I, either philosophers become, kings in 
our states or those whom we now call kings and rulers take to 
the pursuit of philosophy seriously and adequately, and there 
is a conjunction of these two things, political power and 
philosophical intelligence,...** there can be no cessation 
of troubles, dear Glaucon, for our states, nor, 1 fancy, 
for the human race," 
will still ring true to many ears, either covertly or openly.
In the same manner as such philosophers, the Churches 
have either abjured or openly participated in the political 
and social questions of the day as discussed in the 19TB Keith 
Lectures and as effected in Iran at the time of writing (1979/60)
It seems that examples and direct participation in the 
details of affairs, so adroitly side-stepped by Kant, lead very
dix*ectly into a participation which is not our main intent, at 
least not in normative nor prescriptive fashion. However, the 
social sciences will only with difficulty be turned from their 
preoccupations with micro investigations to more fundamental 
methodological approaches so we feel it incumbent upon us to 
include closer definition of the demons which will compose the 
raw materials-for the systems analyst working, with the social- 
scientist.
For these purposes we revert to the critical headings 
for data collection based on the elements of human need.
f\t
Unable or unwilling now to establish among the five eleiafns a 
hierarchy of importance, we select admittedly at random
WARMTH
for what might be termed an investigative trial run, tidying to 
discover what detailed data might necessarily be subsumed under 
this heading and which will form the basis on which the 
systematise!* and soeia 1-sci ent 1st will go to work*
It must be emphasised that this thesis does not set out to 
transfer its concepts and. its data into such a. system as will 
be required by
a) the systems analyser and constructor,
h) the hardware of the system,
c) the language/logic of his system 
and that the ultimate systematic outcome will have to depend on a 
close partnership between the systematise!1 and the 8ocial«scientist 
who will both need a sympathy in objective
surveying the totality of data available in UK Official 
statistics, we suggest that most of these for example will 
need to he feci into any system for analysis of
as one of our postulated* critical needs* Possibly by judicious 
weightings such sy&temati&ation will raise to a high degree
This gives some idea of the material available to the 
systematise!* and the soolal-e dentist* on this material they 
will work when the choices made by totalities of X-P have been 
fed into the system and rectified and adjusted in the light 
of surpluses or deficiencies. Surplus and deficiency will 
probably be assessed in the light of established minima, our 
emphasis on such minima is no new concept. Minimum wage rates, 
minimum standards of living as evidenced by basic social payments,
minimum standards in building, minimum' standards of safety are 
evidenli^iuch levels have commonly been adopted and can be 
accounted.
WARMTH
Climate Tables 2/3
Regulation Tables 6/34
MSlletioe
Snexgy
Housing
Labour
Tables 71/7? 
Tables 1149/177 
Tables 194/210
Tables 230/232
Tables 237/240 and 
2k3/2hk
Construeiion
Manufactured
Goods (selected
Food supplies & Tables 263/270 
Consumption
From such minimum standards there may be freedom to 
opt beyond their provisions. This has already happened in the 
important fields of education and medicine and merely asserts the
fredaom for the individual to elect for alternatives across 
the boundaries of the five elements of human need e.g. 
food* rather than companionship or any other combination.
The constant dynamism of our model through feedback will place 
under constant adjustment levels of minima and indicators of 
surplus or deficiency so that individual choice of J-F 
character will adjust itself to the requirements.
Choice can already be indicated in immediate and subtle tones 
via electronic methods and we envisage the increased and 
more delicate usages of such apparatus.
Against such handling of data which reflect individual 
choice, the five year balloting of opinion on wide ranges of 
options which underwrites the so-called democratic system, 
eeems a singularly blunt instrument. l'w thus anticipate in the 
near future under the aegis of our technologicol methodology as 
exemplified in the social-science model, a complete individual­
isation of choice which will not only provide the systematise!* 
with something in the nature of an approach to qualitative 
individual satisfaction, but reveal at all stages dynamic minima, 
surplus or deficiency#
Increasingly with education in the new methodologies 
and their evidence the realities of availability to choice and not,
we emphasise in terms of materials alone, will cause the I-P 
sector to become increasingly discriminatory in terms of 
possibility, thus reducing if not eliminating the G~P sector 
and this, of course, not for any one need such as warmth, alone, 
but for the w hole gamut of human need.
Moving beyond the official statistics of conditions which
determineuwamtlffeatiofaction, we might attempt to explore 
the I-I' approach in terms of the fines? qualification of 
quantities in such terms as - 
Climate and location 
seasonal variation
Age variation and numbers in household 
Humber, sise and height of apartments 
Heat proofing of building e*g* thickness of walls, 
roof insulation, double .glaring, draught 
proofing*
Presence of absence of central heating and the means
of powering such and at what cost in relation 
to efficiency*
Clothing in t erms of layers and heat retaining 
materials*
Food in relation to Its calorific values and health 
weights*
Such lists, while not differing from those of the official 
statistics, point the way to refinement in relation to 
individual circumstance and seems to learn some lessons from 
the exhaustive efficiency of DurKhelm's collections*
All this will enable provision for per capita returns 
FOE I’liObE IB DIVIBUALa GAfAi&ii OF Ok UXSHXEG- 10 EXFItBSG OlTUAHOB
Ahi) riksFHliEHOB, thus avoiding the need to use artificial "class" 
classifications or set up artificial "norms1 except for those who 
failed so to express themselves or who might have expressed the 
wish to opt out of such expression*
bhould total analysis within the system determine that 
certain levels of social "contribution" would be necessary to 
sustain those individuals whose l-p was minimal or not delarefi 
then one would hope that the principle of other-regardingnees 
which is the etheical demand of thew hole exercise would be 
sufficient to sustain the entirety. That this is already 
demonstrated in practice can be seen in educational and medical 
areas of choice where social participation is accepted ©s 
■obligatory even by those whose exercise of J-p is strong. A 
crucial point will be where the social participation impinges on 
the initial preference end it is here that v,e must rely on 
ts£xamt information acting through the feedbacks posing the 
ethical parameters within thich the revised choice must be 
exercised.
we have selected warmth for a special investigation 
of the possibilities of selecting and handling data in random 
choice from our list of human needs* This is not to assume a 
prior ranking in a hierarchy of needs. Indeed, it might be 
possible to subsume all under a wider connotation applied to 
"warmth" such as "energy" or "power11 • If the systems analyst 
and synthesiser should find that such subsumptiona or elisions 
or alternatively extensions of categories, improved his processes 
then we would certainly concede the possibility of varying our 
tentative list.
It is necessary however, whether under the rule of five 
or more or less heads of need, to face the possibility of 
attainment of the manifold of minima within the capacity of the 
entire system. Here we admit to the need to restrict 
our arguments to the west european style societies which at presen
do seem capable of sustaining such total minimal demands 
viewed in the light of the categories we have proposed*
Mere one to extend the other-regardingness of Individuals 
to "third world" situations, there would be need to reassess 
possibilities# On the other hand, it is perfectly sound to 
envisage a reducatlon in total needs ord emands both from 
I-p and b«F and/or a more efficient utilisation of the resource 
available in totality for their satisfaction*
In all this it should be noted that we move from the 
traditional economist's assessment of "need", "cost",
"contribution" in its guise of Quantities, exchange and 
monetary cost, to © philosophically ethical interpretation 
of those concepts* This move is possibly covered by our 
previously emphasised transition from a quantitative to a 
qualitative approach and much of our argument rests on this 
refinement*
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Induction ed*cwinburni p.96
(3a) Earre principles of s c ie n t i f i c  Thinking London 1970
(9) Lurkheim bulclde Translated by EKL London
(10) Kant Critique of iare season preface to 1st Ed#
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At the end of the 19th century techniques of a 
mathematical and statistical form for use in social analysis 
were in their infancy* Quantification of a simple kind has 
always been a part of census and demographic methodology but 
it was the young science of economics which first made an 
attempt at its exposition in systematic qualifications! terms 
e*g* by Walrus (1) whose work led in the late 19th century to 
the newly named 'discipline of econometrics*
As a result of the industrial and financial crises of the 
1930s, econometrics was given a great impetus since exact 
quantitative information was sought to project the possible 
consequences of policy* Vn der the impetus of political 
socialism this policy was governmental and centralised to an 
increasing degree and very largely clue to the theories and 
advice of Keynes* Econometrics was seen as providing the 
empirical attempt at verifying the "laws” of economic theory*
Fox* example, the econometrician attempted to calculate 
income and price elasticities and to establish relationships 
between the economic variables whose accurate quantification 
might give guidance to central monetary policies.
In such a manner too, Tinbergen (2) tested business cycle 
theories and obtained many coefficients of the inter^depdendency
of phenomena.
By the early 1960s national accounting in t arms of
/V
households, enterprises, goverpient activities, and capital 
formation, presented what was accepted to be a complete picture 
of an entire natiodh economic activities# On such pictures
the whole accountancy of the national activities were based and 
projections made therefrom*
Both monetary unite of indexation could be used as the 
basis for such accounting with weightings to provide an 
increasingly important element to fake the w hole enterprise 
beyond simple quantification processes towards a new element 
of something approaching qualitative estimation and a finer 
model of the whole economy, as developed by the Cambridge school 
of economist/ statisticiaiVmatlaematicians*
It is certain that any tools or .methodologies which 
enable a surer, more accurate and speedier handling of
multifarious data and which can explore alternatives of choice 
within a systematised programme, not exclusively nor 
explicitly mathematical, will enable advances to be made on 
the earlier possibilities based on linear mathematical 
calculation*
sampling based on probability theories began to be used 
between the ware for surveys of economic, political and social 
ends, psychological and medical research developed refined 
method© of assessment of significant similarities and differences 
and made projections therefrom*
however, it is the advance of computer technology that 
is revolutionising the possibility of complex large scale 
analysis of social phenomena* The scientific technolo* sy of 
CYBrMUAflCb which embraces the hardware of the computer ancl the 
software of the systems presented to the computer, ia the major 
tool which oversees every step, every level of our technological 
methodology as exemplified in the model applied to social-science*
As Arise in his paper (3) admits* there must he a great 
deal of simplification of data to melee possible the development 
of manageable systems. An important philosophical debate within 
or concerning cybernetics will be to consider the manner* degree 
and validity of this simplification i.e. how the complex informst? 
can be reduced without falsification and whether 81omants (k) 
scheme of an intelligent mechanism can be considered as an 
adequate controller of the developed system# In any event it is 
certain that such system bleation will enable such greater 
diversity of data to be handled than by previous methods* with 
much greater accuracy and at much greater speed#
be do not wish to go so far as bloman suggests towards 
A.I# or Artificial Intelligence at the helm out we do think'
that cybernetics and its exercises will be invaluable tools of 
social-science if
a) they a re a ble to analyse and handle more clearly
than by traditional mental or logical processes* the 
development and working out of plans9 choices* actions 
and procedures|
b)they are able to produce programmes and tools which 
extend the human c ap&city for handling words* numbers * 
symbols ana their interactions#
•Such programmes * such tools or probes* would be of prime and even 
prior importance for social-scienee because of the diversity of 
individual human choice to which they will be applied# whether 
they will revolutionise philosophy as the title of ^Ionian’s 
work suggests is questionable although they will undoubtedly give 
the philosopher new viewpoints and possibly lead him to fresh 
conclusions#
We find Aleman*8 Sketch of an intelligent mechanism’1 
(which might he better entitled "sketch of an intelligent 
process’1) an interesting model of an approach to such problems 
as engage the soeial-scientst and a copy of which we include 
overleaf* It does seem to indicate «iUi a considerable degree of 
clarity, the approach of mind to problem in a kind of blue-print. 
We suggest that the computational programmer would be able to 
adapt it to our needs*
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(EXPRESSION)OF 
NEW 
PURPOSE 
OR 
PROBLEM
Cybernetic systems postulate goals i.e# they are 
teleologieal in character and set through sensors which 
abstract in terns of the salient attributes of the system* s 
environment* through established but possibly alternative 
goals e.g. Ci, 0iit Giii, «**••* which may be sub-goals of .
^oint systems or a hierarchy of elternstIves* through Error 
Betection which shows up deviations between goal set and 
latemediate state* through Effectors capable of modifying 
operations.
If the philosophical branch of cybernetics is considered 
as lying within a theory of simplification, in the interests 
of that simplicity considered in its aesthetic, economic and 
engineering senses (5)$ then it will follow that cybernetic 
processes within soda 1-science in the setting of its 
technological model, will have to be stricly tailored and that 
without f alsification. we feel that we have already made an 
important contribution to such simplification without falsification 
by suggesting a limited territory for in relation to 1-1.
Professor Miehie of the Machine intelligence Unit of 
the university of Edinburgh (6) gives forcible reminder of the 
need to pare down the syetematisation to minima when he declares 
that fiit would certainly be possible to develop a * sociologist* s 
assistant” computing system of the kind, envisaged but . that it 
would cost a great number of man years of effort.” (n.b. the 
enquiry to Professor Michle was related to a social-science 
system but, as we have noticed,there is little distinction 
in most people's minds, more1s the pity, between soci&l-science 
and sociology.) It is only f air to add the caveat that a
’’soclal-seienee assistant" might involve a still greater 
number of man years of effort (if the difference between sociology 
and aociai-scfence is for Professor Michie such as we see it} 
unless there is determined effort to eoatrol^the scope to which, it 
is intended it shall be applied, such control, however, would 
be seen in the light of more profound reasons than those of man- 
years of effort involved.
Moreover, taking into account the very recent great 
advances in computer and cybernetic technologies through the 
development of the silicon and other chips, it is likely that the 
extent of the difficulties to which the professor refers may have 
been diminished considerably# I seem to detect a note of greater 
optimism in this respect in a chance remark of his heard on the 
radio recently*
'The problem of selection and reduction of data is clearly 
demonstrated when librarians can say (75 t?the central statistical 
Office produces information on practically every subject you can 
think of ” and these are only National Governmental btatietics 
which are drops in the oceans of international and group-national 
collections. Eeductionlsm is not only necessary for the handling
but also for the selection and collection of the data for social- 
science. vve hope that our criteria of food, warmth, security, 
companionship, activity-/leisure under the aegis of minima, may 
contribute to accurate reduction, we also envisage that in the 
aystematination the use of the ,!black>faox,f may incorporate as 
inviolate certain aspects of I-p choice to reduce complexity.
we may hope that with these tools, with these cautions 
and from this platform, we can establish strands of a
short tern ideologically oriented utilitarian style ethic 
which rests on a multiplicity of inputs, compacted so far as 
is justifiable, directed by aesthetic, economic and logical 
considerations, towards an outcome approached by continually
adjusted refinements and in which X-p so refined is an inviolate 
ingredient.
Caveats of cjdaution may be ameliorated by some 
consideration of the capacity of what has been called 
intelligence by .machine* For those who recoil from the 
mechanical solution, George reminds us (0) that “organisms have 
the same sort of drawbacks as machines” and Rose (9)
“cybernation has extended man's intelligence” while Sorin (10) 
concludes that “cybernetic processes may be seen as enabling 
artifidal intelligence to surpass the human one1 which fits in 
closely with our concept of the cybernetic process as a fool 
or probe extending human intelligence.
nonetheless berner (11) wanted to dampen enthusiasts 
who saw cybernetics as a new magic or panacea capable of 
everything, while on the other hand, wishing to reduce the 
pessimism of sceptics who did not anticipate anything useful 
from it. He makes a further felling reminder that the c&fenpions 
of the privacy of human thought do not notice that they 
tfe&mselves belittle its potentialities by stating that man will 
never be capable of developing artificially a machine which is 
superior to human intelligence.
In referring to the field of “sociological” problems 
homer finds this an extremely important but hardly developed 
branch of cybernetics which when accurately analysed might
reveal “superfluous limitations on the.behaviour of people the 
dropping of which.would make life freer and happier”* (my italics) 
one gets a hint here of Teilhard de Chardin* s admittedly 
metaphysical, even mystical, hopes for the. continuing evolution 
of man's capacities by as yet unspecified means*
w^der (12) the founder of^oyberoetfcs^eaw that the real 
danger, to M s  M M ,  was that political leaders might attempt to 
control-their peoples, not by machines which might prove benign, 
but/0 political techniques so very .narrow, personalised and
/f -
|4d’iffereni to human potentialities that they would give the 
■impression of b eitig indeed produced mechanically but at a very 
low performance level,
j Gunderson (13) seems to cap the argument -
“The stance Is often taken that thinking is the crowing 
'■ achievement of the human race, and that if one denies 
that machines can think, one in effect assigns them to 
some lower level of achievement than that attained by 
human beings. But one might well content that machines 
can't think for they can do much better than that, They 
do not need to “think out” the mswera,n
These and other quotations from the literature on cybernet! 
attempt to provide the “cybernetic spectacles” recommended by 
Brix (Ik) which give one forceful reminder of the Kantian 
revolutionary “spectaeles”*
A trite response to the cybernetic argument is often that 
“machines can only do what they ere told” which is about as hoary
a chestnut as ?f statistics always lie*' but it is demonstrated by 
George (15) that the chess player computer within cybernetic 
ayatematla&tlon can outplay the original programmer ana that 
unique mathematical propositions have been given by computer* 
All this takes us a long way from a Luddite reaction*
Nevertheless we can remain constrained by Lucas*(16) 
reminder
/,• tlMo mechanical model (of the mind) will be completely
/^V" adequate nor any explanations in purely mechanistic
/ /
7/ terms* V/e can produce models and explanations and they
/
will be illuminating: but however far they go* there will 
always be more to be said* There is no arbitrary bound 
to scientific enquiry: no scientific inquiry can ever 
exhaust the infinite variety of the human mind*11 
And* as Hose (17) investigating management techniques* reinforces 
from a practical example
”The final word rests with man and the first control need 
of the manager is not Information be- it manual or 
automated but FLKBBAGL ABOUT LlfuoLLF AB A PBEbGlr<*
bo, there are conflicting forces at work, but in positking the 
possibility of the technological and Cybernetioally aided model 
of @ocial«sciencef we stress that the full responsibility for its 
outcome rests with the positor who, to our mind, must have the 
interests of the individuals of the society he intends to 
investigate and serve as hia prime concern* Bocial-science, 
traditionally concerned with G~p must begin from X~P and through 
cybernetic processes lead to the laarlipmisation of both*
Vs:e  do not intend to and indeed cannot here investigate 
the aubteltiea and mechanisms of the cybernetic processes and 
the "hardware*1 with which its handlers are involved. It must 
suffice for this purpose to outline the kind of approaches that 
have been advanced as the bases for programming
/ -
overleaf
The elements to he considered in the greatest degree 
of generality and simplicity for cybernetic systematieatlon 
seem usually to be
0T
pace drnst&Kowell (18o\' > >
or
?TEEiM L REFESSBhTATI OB
v ii^^ vS^ i -i -f*/j, JL '> ‘r0
or j same source* and et the most simplistic that v>e have been 
able to track:
Given an initial situation represented as
AN OBJECT
Given a deaired situation represented as
AN OBJECT
Find a sequence of operations that will transform 
from the initial situation into the desired 
situation.
The' basic verbalised concepts appear to be - 
recognition 
evaluation 
goal setting 
application 
reduction 
transfer
as, in heuristic search, are applied by Ernst and Newell to such 
calculator^ tasks ae
The Missionaries and the Cannibals Tack (p 125)
The Tower of Hanoi Task (p 1$0)
The Father and Eons Task (p 181)
The Three Coins Task (p 19h)
The Water Jug Task (p 221),
all of which demonstrate that the cybernetic methods advanced 
are capable of solving these respective problems which have 
exercised skillful mathematical/philosophical minds or with 
Euler (1736) confirming the impossibility of solving the 
kiddle of the Bridges of Konigsberg*
While admittedly all this is a long way from social-science 
systematisetion, it should be an encouragement to the systematialng
social-scientist that some of the knottiest problems faced by 
the human brain can be solved with speed and efficiency by 
human effort FLOS mechanical ays temat ieation and, if v/e are not 
too greedy and do not demand too much of our system, that it may 
well prove to be simpler, fairer, less biassed and more 
expeditious than other so-called more human methods with unaided ] 
apparatuses*
Two of the main ingredients of the cybernetic
processes are the principles of the FEEDBACK: and the BLACk BOX
which are both concept and probe or tool*
Feedback mechanisms are aimed at maintaining the level 
of a variable, for instance the speed of rotation of an 
electrical motor, at a constant level irrespective of 
disturbance, such as.varying load, by measuring the variable 
and letting the deviation between correct and actual values 
influence a device e*g. the magnetic field of the motor, 
control the level* If the speed, is too high information will be 
given to decrease the current through the magnet thus 
reducing force and vice versa {19}* It Is not difficult to see 
the possibility of transfer of this device to aay the field of
economics in relation to the maintenance of or re-establishment 
of equilibrium where admittedly the multiplicity of the variables 
would considerably increase the complexity of an unaided process* 
Given such mechanisms or tools or probes as "price* and the 
"market", this multiplicity however can be considerably reduced 
and the cybernetic systemstisation cope with Multiplicities*
This can be seen in Grubbstrdm,e diagrammatic representation of a 
micro-economic process from the viewpoint of the producer, first
in terms of price and second in terms of supply quantity
bee Over/-
Fi^BBAOil\jbOOx
RtODUCSRS
of ?'m iimb'mxi^VlRJBUSMT
a.) in terms of £RXGE
me
FROBUOKEi
o f  thu i m m m
b) in terms of SUPPLY ^UAKTITIi&a 
(reference: (20) )
Vihile the application of such systeniatlsation in the 
field of bconamiea seams to have advanced to some degree of 
success, it is another matter that the aystematisation of 
soeial-science could meet with equal or better success# The 
variables there will be greater and to that extent the difficulty 
of adequate representation and. evaluation, 'diner himself (21) 
was not very convinced of the possibility but that was almost 
two decades ago and the technological scene .has undergone a 
dramatic advance since then. If Economics continues to exercise 
itself V/ith qualitative as well as quantitative aspects it may well . 
approach towards the boundaries of social**seienee in its L-q 
aspect and provide progressed methodologies for its "mo the a?*1 science. 
This might seem to draw us close to the jfayekian position in its 
liberal as contrasted with its extreme sense.
A very highly simplified representation of the approach from 
CfrubDStrdm and Lindquist (22) holds out hope of at least ©
commencement in the exercise which is very reminiscent of hopper’s 
open gg contrasted with Closed society
over/*-
■Environment
closed eastern i.e. a system with no interaction 
with the environment.
Boundary of
■system
Environment
open system l*e# some elements are related to 
the system environment.
Ihe BLAOiC BOX concept (2y) seems to hole out considerable 
hopes for simplification without falsification* Within a system 
any element can be conceived ae a “black box” i.e. es an inviolate 
given whose internal!ties cannot be quest iortffed and which enters 
into the system in terms of input into it and output from it, 
alone* Where our analysis has to consider the elements b~p and 
I-P as we have proposed,.it will be highly advantageous from our 
point of view were I*# to be capable of conoideration as an 
inviolate black box.
our presentation of cybernetics and cybernetic systematization 
seems to offer vast possible changes in the handling of the data 
of socialisefence in the manner of a tool of great potential. 
the socialise ience ay sterna User working in close partnership 
with the technologists of systems engineering hardware should no 
longer be deterred by the complexities of his situation, 
especially if, as we reiterate, he is not too greedy about the 
scope of his territory*
v.e suggest that a restrained and systematized social-ocience 
will be concerned with the MINIM as related to our five areas of 
human need in the first instance, with the following caveats 
completely recognised ~
1. that the social-scientist in partnership with the 
systems analyst and cybernetician, must posses the 
background, intellectual and practical training and 
integrity of what is supposedly typical of the 
sc ien tist/'philosopher;
2* that the plethora of data, even within the capable
handling by systems analysts and cybernetic engineers, 
must submit to reduction ana selection by those 
specialists in close consultation with soelal-scientists 
of the qualities indicated;
3* that much depends on the potentiality of the cybernetic 
systematization to be truly self~adJusting by the use 
of its. essential feedback# If this is adequate then the 
faulty experiment or hypothesis will not have to be 
tested to its conclusion since the faults will show 
up to be rectified during and not at the end of the 
process*
k» that the use of the black box technique will be. 
critical in maintaining inviolate the I~? sector and 
in avoiding parenthetic entanglement©:
3» that the ideological approach for soeial-science 
be recognised as short term in aim in contrast with 
teleological philosophical systems of infinite aim 
which may provide pointers for the sociel^seientist.
Note on tlio use of Computerised systematization in medicine
while the social-selectlot is barely in the field of 
cybernetic and computerised systemstieationf medicine has for
some time been fully involved there in diagnosis as tell as in 
research.
one only need refer to the International Journal of 
Biomedical Computing and a sample of its papers to recognise 
the scope of the discussions and new developments -
e#g* The automation of clinical diagnosis Mitchell
Automated system for adeical data processing
BopoV etai.
The computer in the hospital laboratory
summers
Cybernetics of the red-blood cell and bone-marrow
stem-cell system Kirk etal.
The computer analysis of human chromosome©
Timson,
Besides these esoteric uses of computerised systematization 
in medicine there has developed the r datively simple one of 
enabling the individual patient to record symptoms and d etails of 
life-style which might affect those symptoms and which can be 
infinitely more aetailed than those elicited by the medical 
practitioner in his brief face to face encounters in 
consultations, This relative “infinity51 or completeness of data 
accords with the conditions we hove sought for soci&l-solence
It is also apposite here to consider the matter of privacy 
in relation to data collection whether in the medical field or 
elsewhere. The multiplicity of data considered both in content and 
in frequency may help to further the moves towards preventive 
rather than purely curative functions in medicine, and this 
In a manner private to the “patient*1 himself. For social-science
similarly the individual may be a bio to be increasingly discerning 
of the possibilities of M s  choices without intervention*
«e envisage that the individual will become increasingly “literate1* 
in terms of the existence of the technological methodology and 
mouel, of its tools, probes and apparatus and possibly even in the 
design of the systems involved in their use* Then both the 
individual and the totality of individuals will be in a position 
to make more effective use of the opportunities so revolutionarily 
offered*
we wish to examine the case made for a so-called 
General bystems approach to cybernetic practice, such as has so 
carefully been recently offered by Lassie (2k) • '«Ve are not happy 
even vsith our cybernetic systematization sympathies, about such 
attempts to seek some underlying blue print for all the sciences and 
humanities including the social sciences and possibly extended in 
an excess of generalising to all conceptualisation in the name only 
of philosophy* Philosophy wo think we recognise as the orchestra tor, 
mentor par excellence and while we concede that it might well take on 
some of the ambience of the 1'echnological Methodology in its 
utilisation of special tools or probes, we do not see it as subsumed 
by or even equal partner with something which has become termed 
“bystem© Analysis” which we see as method or tool but not as totality* 
Lven if we accept with Lassslo the t erm he uses in his title “bystems 
Philosophy”, we. see this as a subsidiary aspect only of the 
perennial Philosophy*
Lesslo is intent on returning from Analytic to synthetic 
philosophy and seems to see in his -General systems approach a
pure synthesis rather than the hierarchical strueture in holistic 
ambience evidenced in his diagrammatic representations*
he do not view von Berialanffy* s list of new disciplines 
reverently quoted by,Lasslo, vox* general systems theory,
cybernetics, inforioatlon^theory, decision theory, games theory etc*
as more than specific tools which will enable specialist areas, 
each in its own manner, to be worked in more efficiently*
Admittedly Lasslo in his conclusions quotes tSappold as saying that 
synthesis “does not mean that a man should strive to know
everything about e very thing”* However it appears that he is claim
for the General Systems Analyst something of this omniscience*
Boulding (25) takes this argument further - 
“The more s£i$®ce breaks up into such groups* • • • the less 
communication is possible among the disciplines: however, 
the greater the chance there is that the total growth of
knowledge is b eing slowed down by the loss of relevant 
communications# The spread of specialised deafness means that
someone who ought to know something that someone else knows 
isnt able to find out for lack of generalised ears* It is 
one of the main objectives of General systems Theory to 
develop these g eneraliaecl ears, and b y d eve loping a 
framework or general theory to enable one specialist to 
catch relevant communications from others.”
Such comment seems to smack of
a) failure on both sides of the “divides” to simplify so 
that the other “chap” can understand* Both Kant and 
such recent physicists as Bragg considered that their 
erudition should be available to the common man by lucid 
presentation and that unless this px*oved possible, their 
work would be diminished.
hj o. scene of intellectual conflict and mistrust, of greed 
for the other1a knowledge and a fruitless aim to be a 
know-all with the consequent flattening and thinning 
of content# The pendulum swings between specialisation
and g eneralioation are frequently violent*
A further danger in the proposal to use a Generalised Bystem 
is exemplified by Berien {27}, who is basically a psychologist, and 
who in his contribution uses ninety-one of his references having 
verbal inclusion of “psychology” or “behavioural” in their titles,
with many more that' could well be subsumed under such classification 
in his exposition of a General system* one wonders how aware he is 
that he is slanting the general towards the psychological* How 
general is general for the General systemstiser?
How easy it is for such a psychologist/sociologist/
systematise!* seeking a General system to slip as does Berien from 
adaption (p*161} to survival, to conflict (p.163), to aggression 
to rebellion {p. 163), to revolution (p.167), to parasitism (p*169), 
to exploitation (p.173), to confrontation (p*l?5), to war (p*177), 
to frustration (p.179)* to anger (p*1?9, to destruction (p»179)* 
Admittedly sudd only 1 applying the brake on page 180 Berien says;
“not all frustrations necessarily result in aggression* We need not 
here review the literature which shows that frustrations may result 
in other alternative responses such as apathy, retreats, denials, 
compensation or con structive problem solving15*
Berien 1b not alone in such predilection among General Systems 
Analysers for slipping into the paradigms of war games, as if 
“confrontation”, “conflict” and “aggression5* were the natural outcomes 
faced by the general systomatieer*
^ 0 i-rultt and. Mcfc&nlaon (6) exemplify their approaches through 
political ana military etrugMe, angry rate, angry children, 
alcoholics, guerilla bands, llm& ox* hore&n conflicts*
here we m y  see excxnp.lifted a ©©^called generalist nyBiesaatlae*. 
bound .by his conceptual sehexn&s (psychological) ami M s  cultural 
political environment (USA) and erroneously it seems assuming 
that be follows a generality ®hich we surest might prow not only 
limited but therefore misleading#
The University of Hawaii is engaged in a general systemstlsatl 
research scheme based on or related to International war# Feasibly 
•peaceful or optimistic approaches to systemstiestion have yet to be 
funded*
In General Systems Analysis there is also much danger that 
the psychologically based scientists who devote much effort in 
this field, rely on metaphors and models of a biological,
Darwinian evolutionary type, which claim generalisation in 
systemtisation although Berien in M s  final nummary (p 187} hints 
that some anthropological situations will not fit info the scheme 
but he stops short of elaboration having possibly perceived a chink
in the armoury#
of •
hhile we concede that Berien follows our posited approach
system definition 
cozap&n&nt identification 
black hoz 
feedback 
'storage
memory banks
variability components 
adaptation
uncertainty provision 
adaptation of systems 
selection of output 
m  do not agree 'with his conclusion (page 31} that
** there is thus no logical b&rxwier to believing 
that we may discover basic relationships among and 
within systems that are the same for biological 
physical and social systems properly definedfn 
for Berien1© approach is always made in terms of CrhB (Group 
Heed Satisfaction) which is possibly equivalent to our 8~P 
and he does not seem to see that the approach may be made from 
another .direction of emphasis on what we call I-p*
There would it seems to us be no particular virtue or need 
for positing one generalising system of analysis or synthesis
when specific areas may need specific systems, specific tools, 
apparatus or probes, specific blueprints* The carpenter’s kit 
is very different from that of the plumber and so by parallel 
metaphor it may well be that there will be proved need for a 
greater diversity of approach that at present offered by General 
systems Analysts who seem to see in their bystem a greater 
profundity than that of the model, tool, probe or apparatus we 
have been at pains to insist is in extension of man’s capacity*
While for the moment the social-scientist relies on statistical 
data, computer languages, input-output analysis, computer hardware, 
black boxes and the common theses of systematisers, we do not blind 
outselves to a possible development of better specialist tools more 
suited to sub-systems and not all transferable* We seek to utilise
and develop modern tools, probes or apparatus for the development 
of systematisations specific to specialisations, which can work 
alongside, in possible exchange with and in harmony and cooperation 
and not in conflict with other systems, but which do$£ not 
lead to a manner of a priori blanketing.
Vie conclude that systematis analysis via cybernetic 
computerisation with its attendant apparatus, tools or probes 
in extension of human c apacity, is valid for social-science but 
that a generality of systernatisation is suspect.
Keforence to section on 
The Tool of Cybernetic Bystemat isation
(1; Walrus
(2) Tinbergen
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(6) Michie
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(9) Lose
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(11)Berner 
wiener
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(Ik, Erix 
( 13) George 
(16)Lucas
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V«e conclude that ~
The state of soeial-seience which has had a long and practically 
continuous history seems still to he unhealthy and frequently held 
in disrepute* There is question of Its titular blalm to being 
science and even of the necessity for its discrete existence.
On the other hand there are claims from within social-science 
which seem to lead if towards an all embracing and overriding 
discipline encroaching on rather than being supported by philosophers 
and philosophy.
The matters of society do need specialised exploration to 
determine their extent, their repercussions and their* impact on 
the individuals for whom those very matters may seem to have arisen. 
Much explorations we have submitted may indeed lay claim to being 
scientific and technological in the modern meaning of such t erms.
The unhealthy state and frequently held disrepute of %lm 
social-science, even when the existence of that science is admitted, 
seems to arise from the fact that no adequate methodology 
exemplified by adequate models has been developed for the social 
sciences themselves* The methodologies of the sciences in their 
so-called “natural** connotation and of the humanities as applied to 
social-science have proved inadeau&e in that context, either from 
outmoded concepts basic to those methodologies or from maladroit 
applications by scientists and humanists inexpert in social-science*
It is now expedient to consider alternative strategies.
The Zeitgeist of the latter half of the 20th century having led 
philosophers and philosophical scientists to serious reconsideration 
of the importance of homo faher in relation to and in extension of 
homo sapiens, leads the social-scientist to a critical assessment 
of such an alternative strategy through the exploration of the 
Technological Methodology with its concomitant model,
The Technological Methodology with its model seems to be 
especially adapted to the needs of soclal-science, grounded as 
that science is in the needs of individual humans ’who, in 
totality, present a plethora of data which require elaborate 
and delicately systemstiaed projection. It may therefore be that 
the Technological Methodology and its model are priorly and 
primarily suited to soclal-science in its basic need for 
delicate instrumentation lying beyond the unaided capacities 
of human skills*
The device of the model as elucidatory in many matters, 
is explored in some detail aa it reflects the system© t is a. t ion 
of the apparatus, tools or probes in a manner which may be seen 
to support the selection of individual choice as its grounding 
and the safeguard of feedback as a controlling and rectifying 
element.
There is important scope, which is explored herein, for a 
detailed consideration of the vocabulary, concepts and data 
of the subsidiary social sciences and of social-science itself, 
such exploration is in common with that necessary in other 
specialised fields including philosophy where it has assumed 
overriding importance in some recent schools.
The data and the cybernetic systematisation of socia1-science 
is seen as grounded in qualitative rather than merely quantitative 
aspect ana, together with the vocabulary and conceptual bases, 
provide what can be considered as tool, probes or apparatus to 
be employed in a total technological methodology in extension 
of human capacity and. from which there can be envisaged further, ' • 
if as yet undeveloped, advances*
The application of the. systesaatisation to the plethora 
of data available iS/coStrasted with the less sophisticated 
handling of data by such as Durkheim in his work on Buie id©, 
which seems to demonstrate the suporimpoeitlon on the data of 
pre-suppositions* without the safeguards of such devices as 
feedback which form a crucial part of the cybernetic systemstisatioru
The contributory sciences within the overall concept of 
a social-science need clearer delineation than is at present usual, 
scientists and philosophers alike possibly need more knowledge of 
and/or more sympathy with social-science as it develops under the 
aegis of the new guidelines. It ie most important that the part - 
sociology - should not be repeatedly confused with the whole - 
aocial-science*
Far- from bringing a materialistic approach, the proposition . 
of a soelal-science technological methodological approach, takes into 
account the e thical, aesthetic and episteiaological requirements 
posed by philosophy and which stem from the compassionate 
and sling enlightened interests of the Individual. Such, 
enlightenment proceeding from the continuous feedback through the 
system as demonstrated in the model*
LfsVvb | males and norms in social-scienee, as indeed 
increasingly in other sciences,.give way to tendency statements 
and short rather than long run sightings and tkct short run forecasts 
proceeding therefrom are subject to rapid and constant review 
made possible through the methodology advocated* so it is in the 
review of the present rather than in prognostication that the 
main possibilities lie* so tendency statements and short term 
probability projections give to social-science a limited teleologieal 
orientation*
Crucially there will be need for an association of 
soeial-scientists with&a systems analysts and constructors 
for the development of cybernetic processes* Such association will 
demand of the social^scientist new scientific, mathematical and 
engineering insights if not expertise- and of the cybernetician an 
equal insight into the soeial-soienee he hopes, in partnership, 
to systematise*
ADl)i£NJDA
i.e have found it interesting and possibly useful to note 
that there exists a Joint Committee with secretariat, uniting the
projects of the British science Besearch Council and the social 
Science research Council* It might be hoped, in the terms of this 
thesis, that this would lead to some unison of approach end some 
blurring of the accepted boundaries between the natural and the 
social sciences*
This Committee, chaired by lord Ashby, faster of Clare 
College, Cambridge, published in 1975 a brochure entitled ”hew 
Postgraduate Patterns Blending the Natural and Social bciences*rt 
The'preface reiterates the intention of the Committee of 1968 
to "foster broader postgraduate training blending (my Italics) 
Information from science and engineering with the social sciences*51 
However, in its proposals (page 8) and in its Appendix VII (pp22**26) 
it is evident that emphasis lies in the business and traditional 
economic fields and in specific problems therein almost exclusively* 
An exception to this limitation may lie in the advertised work of 
Edinburgh University*a Modal studies (sic) Unit, via: Application 
of technology to developing societies with particular reference to 
Mexico ABB The Modal and Economic aspects of the Volta Dam AhD 
scientific Ideas about women {sic}* There seem to be no sponsored 
investigations from a methodological, logical or philosophical 
basis towards the desired collaboration or1,blending%
Indeed ouch a hope for methodological, logical or 
philosophical approaches made in 1976 was rejected by the Committee
the "standpoint is much more philosophical than that
of the Joint MEG/BUKO Committee which must inevitably 
concentrate on producing evidence that interdisciplinary 
work is of value* Essentially the Joint Committee is 
concerned with encouraging scientists and engineers to 
become conversant with social science techniques and 
practices, in the belief that those who seek careers 
in industry and the public service will then be better 
equipped to deal with the sort of problems their jobs 
will entail*********81
signed on behalf of the Joint 8E0/bbHC Committee 
Secretariat and dated 13 March 1976
This leads us to suggest that the Joint Committee may be 
failing to see the wood for the trees and that a change of perspective 
might be of considerable help to the whole field of such sponsored 
research*
AWs$iWU
A good deal of b'itxm top the confusions regarding the 
eaiiflemoni of social science and its subsidiary disciplines 
must ho lolb at thu of libraries ;UhXishers.
be&ey $30 i 13 co rrec tly  dossiiUefi m  ’‘social science"* but 
musy libraries sab book shelves are labelled erroneously ’'sociology' 
for the v&rea of classifieation 320 ana it has been one of the 
practical contributions of ourselves to question and attest to 
rectify those deviations, i:his. la not at might at first sight 
appear trivial and unlikely to have much effect on the social 
sciences 1m % m m  serious m id advanced students ceil be tshen in 
by the continuous bosi&ardmeat of sealer sad peripheral 
contributions which descend frequently through harassed end 
inundated classifiers to anything with the prefix wsocw In the 
title.
be are insufficiently m  fait with other ol&Steificstory 
library systems to do more than sm&z$$t that if librarianship 
h&©# at is appears from its literature to have, its own developing 
methods of systematic aaalyeia, by word count scanning' for example, 
theee might usefully be employed in culling from sociaX^aclenea 
shelves and possibly relegating to the. &ub~cl&$slf loti t  Iona or even 
to other classes such m  social b tudles, humsm society, human 
inter-relations in society and such.
this places a heavy burden on the librarian who is 
infrequently social-nciantist and often drawn from literary 
specialisms and who may essentially need some such tool as &ord
counting computerised systems accurately to assess the correct 
classification of socialise!ence# Criteria for such counting 
would oe critical out a beginning might he made with say, The 
.encyclopaedia of the social sciences headings further culled 
by teams of specialist social^scientists for refinement#
Possibly more dangerous still for the health of 
social-science, is the competence to judge of the heads of 
publishing divisions# look, for example, at the publisher’s 
blurb on the cover of winch’s paperback# This quotes in 
gloss and in red (this from The Times Literary (sic) Supplement) 
"This is a brave and interesting book. It may 
turn out to be a very important one# For it 
is far and away the liveliest and most cogent of the 
responses yet made to that staid official judgment of 
soma years ago, that POLITICAL j?HILObOFHX (my italics) 
must now be presumed dead*"
Treble danger here. First, that The Times Literary supplement is 
conceived as competent judge on socialise!ence# Second, that 
political philosophy is taken as the nub of the monograph# Third 
that a publisher’s man, including this book in a g roup 
publication entitled "studies in Philosophical psychology" 
is considered competent in the social-acience field# such are 
the weaknesses that a review of the library classifications with 
new aids might expose#
Librarians are not insensitive to the matters here 
discusses but their concerns seem to be quantiative rather than 
qualitative i#e# they seem to wish to be able to classify all 
the matter put put in the name of social-science, rather than 
involve themselves in a specialist expertise which might enable
to assess the qualities of the matter offered against the 
criteria established# Classification and information retrieval 
processes are inadequate if they are not accompanied by some 
form of qualitative appraisal based on truly soc ial-science
determined criteria#
The specialist social-scientist is limited by his 
tools, probes and apparatus among which printed words, figures and 
books and libraries must figure largely# Defect© must be recognised . 
and attacked*
■ It Is interesting to find that Fosset*s "Classification 
and Indexing in the Facial Faiences" Butterowrth second edition 1974 
on p.15
"perhaps the most important task at the moment, therefore, 
is to bring about a closer relationship between librarians 
and research workers in social science#" 
and p 18ix
11A start has been made, but much more remains to be done #*• 
on the one hand specialists must be shown that librarians 
understand their work and have the right sort of skills to 
be a ole to contribute to it. an Hie other, librarians 
have to be attracted away from their allegiance to traditional 
systems that put an antique look on their collections and 
arouse suspicion instead of trust*"
Admittedly time may restrain, simplify and reduce the 
peripheral and ill-admitted input but have we the time to spare 
in the face of the denizations sometimes justifiably hurled on 
the so-called "eoclal-science" literature?
For work on Automatic Indexing and'research thereon 
giving insight to its potential for classification which would 
especially affect soeial-science, see 13B& Monograph 91 
{1970 edition) uo department of Commerce, National Bureau of 
standards*
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Botes on the Contributors to the quantity/quality discussion
1* Walter koaenblith b.1913 Professor of Communications 
Biophysics in B*X.T,s Department of electrical 
engineering# otucies neuroelectric activity in 
relation to the sensory performance of organism© 
with the aid of electronic devices and mathematical 
models.
2# John Kemeny former assistant to Binatein at Princeton.
Teaches mathematics at Dartmouth College where his 
project engages in the application of mathematics to 
the social sciences.
3# Victor V/eisskopf Professor of Physics at B.I.T.
4* B.Stevens Professor of psychology at Harvard and
Director of the psycho-Acoustic Laboratory, devoted 
to research in hearing and communication.
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There are further concepts from the discipline of Economics 
which might usefully be subjected to investigation for their 
suitability for use in branches of socla1-science other than 
economics -
price (in non-financial terms)
Hisk/Oncertainty/frofit
Choice
Monopoly
Liquidity
Investment (in non~financial terms)
Lsisses faire 
Value
Wage (in no n«*f inane ial terms)
Opportunity Cost*
Whether or not their transferability to other branches of 
social-science were conceded, it would be profitable for these 
and other such economic concepts to be subjected to the hind 
of detailed treatment demonstrated by tie analytical philosophers 
of the first half of this century*
KOTH; It may well be that there are- concepts from other special 
areas of social~seience that have e qu&l possibility of 
transferability* It is not our purpose to discuss these herein.
m z m m m  s
Suggesting some reasons for not 
including History among the 
Social ociences*
It may he salutary to reflect on Rant's short shrift to 
the historical aspect of M s  work in his aritiq.ue of f ure Reason.
Out of k&3 (a; pages 7 sections ana 12 chapters, he devotes
only three pages, no sections and one brief chapter to the whole 
history of the philosophy to his time# If we exclude from this 
hie introductory and final remarks, he gives in total only-four 
paragraphs and shout 700 words to a whole synopsis of the development 
of philosophical systems and thought up to the development of the 
Humean revolution# Vie admit to respecting such brevity and some 
antipathy to obsessions with the historical outside its own 
territories* Re respect and en^oy history in its own right but 
are alarmed by its continually growing influence in the past century, 
its claim to be able to eontx^ol philosophy and the social e eiences an 
its frequent support of power seeking political outlooks. As has 
been stressed elsewhere hex&n, one of our aims bee been to try to 
redress imbalances of excess and we suggest that the historical 
approaches have achieved too great an academic importance*
There are those who claim that history is not backward, looking 
that philosophies of history which demonstrate either cyeelical 
movements or underlying necessity which drives the human race in
certain inevitable directions, are not concerned with the past, 
mat the past can be used only to examine philosophically certain 
trends may be conceded but it is inevitable that the evidence is 
drawn from c ause to effect in longer than abort term naiiEEXtnxEffjSEt 
approach. A great deal of responsibility rests on the shoulders
of those historians whose systematisations have exercised great 
po??er beyond their own frontiers e.g. R&rx or on those who have 
dragged possibly outmoded systems into the present in despite of 
their mentors.
Croce, originally antiquarian and literateur, in his
Theory and fraction of Historiography (b) , argues that history 
exhibits the actual workings of the mind, that philosophy 
describes the methods of history, that to understand is to 
see historically.
Gollingwood, much quoted by social scientists and especially 
by Winch (c; was originally archaelogist of Roman Britain who came 
to see it as his life's work to effect a rapprochement between 
history and philosophy# philosophers since Descartes, he thought, 
had been too much concerned with “science” ae he conceived it and 
which he felt alien to hie thought style. Two world wars seem to have 
convinced him that the e cfences had been unable to solve problems of 
human affairs and that a philosophy fused with history promised 
greater chance of success e.g. in the ifHew leviathan” (d). Certainly 
his method is nakedly historical in the simplest s ense, in that 
he aske himself how philosophers have actually xpes proceeded and 
what methods they have in fact adopted. Hie study of 
presuppositions (e) is a disentangling of those pre-suppos1tions 
found at a particular historic period e.g. Aristotlean as 
expounding Greek science, ilantian as expounding hewtonian physics 
and Gpinosean as pointing to the identity of the two sets of 
presupposition ** God and hature*
Chronicle history discounted by Aristotle in the roeticB (f; 
was revived by historians with a purpose such as Augustine and Bossuet
who saw history as the working out of Providence. ‘with the 
Enlightenment came the possibility of a history that paralleled 
science with a universal validity, ’then followed, revulsions from 
such scientism in the works of Bilthey, Croce and Collingwood who 
posed what they saw as a third way between history as “chaos” and. 
history as ”science”. They stressed the evidence of expressions 
of past thinking by purposive agents which the historian must
reconstruct and re-enact in his own mind* This can assuredly be 
admitted as reasonable ground for the discipline of history itself 
but it can scarcely be seen as legitimate basis for a science of 
society which must be grounded in current data, or for any claim to 
be able to subsume philosophy. Bor can we accept a dictum of 
presuppositions such as “history repeats itself” whether in
particulars or cyclically or on underlying discernible trends
such as those proffered by neo-Darwinian evolutionists, any more than
we would, give support to the Fordian “dictum”.
The use of History for propaganda may at one and the same 
time encourage accuracy in research but also engage in the 
suppression or enhancement of “traces”. This is admitted by Slade 
to be one of the main impediments to historical methodological 
development and if thus admitted by the historian himself, it would 
seem to give additional warning to ©ocialnsefence to stand apart
from, if not divorced from, History.
bocial-science might thus a void the a priori suppositions 
of another approach to Truth, of theories and laws to which the
historian opines that events and relationehBip© must conform, 
whether for example©, through & theory of divine intervention as 
preached by the mdeiaevalist, natural sleetivity as offered by
Darwinians, or the political power oriented theories of latter- 
day Marxians, social-scientists having to guard against their 
own limiting presuppositions, might sensibly avoid those of another 
party whose close relationship to its own seems yet to ge cogently 
argued.
Popper in his “poverty of historicism” (h) is mainly 
concerned to reinvestigate the arguments for and against tjae 
scientific claims of social science. The Historian, as he sees it, 
has decided that social science .is not science* Popper emphasises 
“if there is such a thing as growing human knowledge then we cannot
anticipate today what we shall know only tomorrow”.
However we would moderate this scepticism since the social- 
scientist, in our view, is assessing tomorrow on the basis of today 
and yesterday. The critical factor is the length of the time-scale 
envisaged* Popper seems to mean by historicism an approach to 
socia1-science which a ssumes that historical prediction in an 
unidentified time scale is their principal aim.
Topper challenges the criticismsof historicism in surveying 
social science in ao far as they concernjinability to set up 
experiment| laws * complexity* objectivity* prediction and holism, 
lie comes to his peroration declaring that the historieist and the 
historian (it never seems clear that the distinction is made 
absolute) are trying to compensate themselves for the loss of an 
unchanging world by clinging to the faith that change can be 
foreseen because it is ruled by unchanging law.
when expositions of History and Historical Philosophies are
based as is Bray1 s expose, (i) on Queen Elisabeth 1 , the Trench 
devolution, Charles I, Disraeli, Victorian England, Homan Britain, 
American civil war and Lincoln, in quick succession we feel that 
our point may be underlined* Natural occurrences are out and 
whether Queen Elisabeth “had a sore throat on a given morning 
becomes an object of historical study only if it may have 
prevented her from attending a privy council meeting*M
However, we are not here majorly concerned with the 
delimitations of the historian*s field: we are only concerned to 
assess whether History is a tool of social-science* Ho•far as we 
can discern most historians and philosophers of history are majorly 
concerned with the past either for itself or as the base for 
projections based on its interpretation*
If, according to Mauderoaum causal judgments are suspect* 
metaphysical theories and cyclical projections are to be rejected,
then we may be right to feel that the uncertainties of histoi'ical
theorising in itself make history a suspect tool for the social-
scientist which would only add to the confusions which have been
only too apparent in the social sciences themselves*
be have wished only to assess History as participant in 
the total methodology and reject even this limited claim while 
respecting its integrity as a discrete study whose conclusions 
may be observed by the social-scientist in company with many other 
peripheral or extraneous territories*
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concerning Bhetoric
It is so that the presentation of an argument, thesis 
or study depends for* its acceptability not only on scientific 
considerations of testability but on aesthetic, ethical and 
epiatemological considerations. In all this the manner of 
presentation may be critical* he enter the today still largely 
unfashionable territory of rhetoric or argumentation*
The term rhetoric is possibly out of favour because of 
its political connotation gained from fanatical outpourings
which have gained large audiences* Yet rhetoric in its 
philosophical setting has a most ancient and honourable past. 
Aristotle (a) finds it part of social science ~
"We also find that even the most honourable 
of skills, e.g. strategy, economics, rhetoric, 
come within the province of social science."
ferelman, Olbrecht and Tyteea (b) make a convincing 
modern study of rhetoric. They quote from hartre (e)
"Hugo; ’ lie didnt convince me. Ko one can convince 
me that one shouldn’t lie to one’s comrades. But if 
he had convinced me, that would be more reason to kill
him, because that would prove that he’s capable of 
convincing others.’/,
They themselves argue that only the existence of an 
argumentation that is neither compelling nor arbitrary can 
give meaning to human freedom, a state in which a reasonable
choice may be exercised. If the exreeiae of this freedom 
is not baaed on reasons, every choice would be irrational and 
reduced to an arbitrary decision operating in an intellectual
void. There must be, they conclude, an analysis of those forms 
of reasoning which have been neglected by logicians from the time
of Descartes. Compromises achieved through argumentation appear
to be the only solution once dichotomies have seen allowed to arise.
In his later work without associates (d) rerelman, possibly 
due to hi© legal background, emphasises the concept of justice 
as the base from which to observe and discuss the method of argument, 
he is certainly not alone among philosophers in appealing to justice 
as the foremost criterion but in Pereiman we see justice as 
balancing the scales between the evidence and the argued evidence 
and here the signs of the lawyer become evident.
Into the lawyer’s assessment of situation there creeps 
inevitably the opinion which since Parmenides has been seen as 
Contrasted with truth. Pereiman introduces the moderating influence 
of probability thus •
**The reasons on which our decisions are based consist 
more often than not of opinions which we consider the most 
probably, probability in this case being as in any case 
rarely susceptible of quantitative determination* These
opinions are worked out by means of reasonings whichdepena 
neither on ©elf evidence nor on analytic logic but on 
presumptions whose investigation depends on the theory of 
argumentation* Xki hot all opinions and all argumentations 
merit equal consideration. This does not prevent the 
existence of a rational argumentation, an argumentation,
which, like li&nt’s categorical imperative claims to be valid 
for the community of reasonable minds#"
rerelman wants to stir the self evident first principles 
on which the structures of modern logicians are based* Argumentation 
will set model against model and
"we propose a conception of the nature of rational argument 
such that, just because it engages the assent of the man
who develops it as well as of the man who admits it, can 
for this very reason be subjected to Kant’s categorical 
imperative s we should only propose, as instruments of 
convincing others, statements and methods of supporting 
them which both pass the test of our self constituted 
judgment and, at the same time, will hold good for the 
whole intellectual community*"
"uithout opinion, appearances and impressions our access 
to truth, reality and objectivity is closed." he need Ferelman 
emphasises a criterion for distinguishing these opinions from the 
truth although knowledge expressed in language is always 
"perfectible but always imperfect"* The rationality of our 
opinions cannot be guaranteed "once and for all"# It is in the 
effort to get them accepted that truths are worked out, made specific 
and refined# The Kew Rhetoric or Theory of Argumentation, finding 
its origins in a tradition of Greek Rhetoric and Dialectic’ is his 
specific* The object of ferelman’s theory of argumentation in its 
modern form (which I do not see as different in any vital sense 
from the older forms) is the study of the discursive techniques 
that allow one to "bring about or increase the adherence of minds 
to the theses that one pro£>osea for their assent." Par
"nothing permits us to think a priori that the degrees 
of adherence to a thesis are proportional to its 
probability and to evidence and truth. It is good 
method not to confuse at the outset the aspects of 
reasoning relative to truth with those relative to 
adherence but to study them separately, 1reocoupation
about their interference or their eventual correspondence 
might come afterwards* only on this condition is it 
possible to develop a theory of argumentation that has 
a philosophical bearing."
However is spite of M s  warning against preoccupation 
with eventual correspondence rerelman stresses that the Audience 
must be borne in mind. In the ancient rhetoric the aim was the 
persuasion of the "common herd" (e). ferelman no doubt would 
offer his argumentation to more esoteric audiences but he falls 
short of adopting the methods of psychology and pefers to establish 
a logics1/philosopMcal base for the a rgumentation which will 
persuade*
While Burkhardt described antiquity’s interest in rhetoric 
as a "monstrous aberration" and while under Ramus ife became an 
approach so limited as to lose all concern with content and only 
thought of the externals of verbal ornamentation, yet its appeal 
as a philosophical study has been perennial. It is possibly in the
aftermath of the intense studies of the logical positivists and 
their concern with linguistics and communications theory, that the 
current revival of interest in argumentation or rhetoric has found 
footing (f)
Facts presented in favourable or unfavourable manner
may in certain circumstances be viewed with a favour or a 
disfavour loading to the questioning of their truth or falsity 
baaed not on fact but on manner of presentation and reception. 
Dialogue, interchange, communication, argumentation and dialogue 
may lead to true consensus or to sharpened continuing- debate with - 
the hope of new tools, new probes new apparatus emerging in the 
process for the elucidation of truth.
In all of this we would cede to philosophy the main task 
of the oversight of the tool of argumentation for it is a delicate
tool which could colour and possibly control theorising, model-making 
and methodologies.
fossibly the final word might rest with oakeshott (g) 
"Philosophy consists not in persuading others but 
in .making clear our own minds*"
Perhaps this is the most important role for argumentation and not 
only for the philosopher but also for the soclal-scientist.
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